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Static And Dynamic Efficiency Of Pooled Broiler Contracts: Relative-Performance Contracts Vs. Fixed-Performance Contracts

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  • Wang, Yanguo
  • Jaenicke, Edward C.

Abstract

With the broiler industry as a backdrop, this paper develops theoretical models to compare optimal incentives of pooled relative-performance and fixed-performance contracts in static and dynamic models that account for both adverse selection and moral hazard. In spite of some growers' complaints about the relative-performance contracts used in the broiler industry, model results largely justify the popularity and superiority of relative performance contracts relative to fixed performance contracts

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2004. "Static And Dynamic Efficiency Of Pooled Broiler Contracts: Relative-Performance Contracts Vs. Fixed-Performance Contracts," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20406, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea04:20406
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20406
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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