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Grower Heterogeneity and Governance: Authority, Access, and Countervailing Power

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  • Hendrikse, George W.J.

Abstract

The increasing differentiation on the supply side of agricultural and horticultural markets has resulted in many governance structure changes between growers and wholesalers. For example, marketing cooperatives are restructured, heterogeneous associations split up in various one-product associations, growers integrate forward into wholesaling, and so on. These developments are analysed with an incomplete contracting model addressing horizontal as well as vertical relationships in a multilateral setting. The interactions between authority, access, and countervailing power in the choice of governance structure are highlighted.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrikse, George W.J., 2004. "Grower Heterogeneity and Governance: Authority, Access, and Countervailing Power," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20046, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea04:20046
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20046
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1996. "The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 12(4), pages 53-69, Winter.
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    4. George Hendrikse & Jos Bijman, 2002. "On the emergence of new growers' associations: self-selection versus countervailing power," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 29(2), pages 255-269, June.
    5. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
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    7. Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2007. "Property Rights and Finance," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Erik Berglöf & Gérard Roland (ed.), The Economics of Transition, chapter 7, pages 213-242, Palgrave Macmillan.
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    Cited by:

    1. Evans, Lewis & Meade, Richard, 2005. "The Role and Significance of Cooperatives in New Zealand Agriculture, A Comparative Institutional Analysis," Working Paper Series 18942, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    2. Evans, Lewis & Meade, Richard, 2005. "The Role and Significance of Cooperatives in New Zealand Agriculture, A Comparative Institutional Analysis," Working Paper Series 3847, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    3. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18942 is not listed on IDEAS

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