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Veterinarians, Paraprofessionals, Farmers and the Quality of Clinical Veterinary Services: A role play experiment

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  • Ilukor, John
  • Birner, Regina

Abstract

The study examines the interaction of farmers, veterinarians and paraprofessionals in provision of clinical veterinary services. It uses a role play experiment to examine how farmers and service providers interaction influences the quality and demand for clinical services. The game was played in four rounds and quality of clinical services was measured using scores in drug prescription for selected animal diseases in each round. Statistical tests were performed to test whether quality of services provided by paraprofessionals and veterinarians differ. Service provider learning curves were constructed to examine whether the quality of services provided by paraprofessionals improves as they continue to interact with veterinarians. Farmer’s belief updating curves were also constructed to examine whether farmers change their beliefs about paraprofessionals on receiving information about quality of their services. A logistic regression model for binary panel data was estimated to determine factors that influence farmer decisions to change service providers. Results show that the quality of services offered by veterinarians are not significantly different from services offered by paraprofessional’s trained in veterinary science. However, the quality of services offered by service providers who are not trained in veterinary medicine are significantly different from those offered by veterinary trained service providers. Continued interaction between paraprofessionals and veterinarians gradually leads to improvement in quality of clinical veterinary services among paraprofessionals with general agriculture and social science training but not with paraprofessionals with no formal training or education. Farmers do not easily to change their beliefs about paraprofessionals and this depends on gender of the farmer, previous outcome and livestock production system. The paper argues that the slow pace in which farmers update their beliefs about paraprofessionals limits paraprofessional’s willingness and readiness to learn or consult with veterinarians. However, use of animal health medical cards would induce paraprofessionals to provide quality services and enable farmers to measure the quality of services thus improving quality clinical services in the long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Ilukor, John & Birner, Regina, 2013. "Veterinarians, Paraprofessionals, Farmers and the Quality of Clinical Veterinary Services: A role play experiment," 2013 Fourth International Conference, September 22-25, 2013, Hammamet, Tunisia 160476, African Association of Agricultural Economists (AAAE).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaae13:160476
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.160476
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    References listed on IDEAS

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