Optimal Liability Rules for Combined Human-AI Health Care Decisions

The integration of AI for healthcare redefines medical liability, converting decisionmaking into a collaborative process involving a technological tool and its user. When a harm is caused, both users and manufacturers of AI may be responsible. The judicial system has yet to address claims of this nature. We build a model with bilateral care to study which combinations of liability rules are socially efficient. Both agents could face strict liability, be subject to negligence rules or face hybrid regimes: one agent faces a fault liability regime, while the other operates under strict liability. We highlight two crucial elements: (i) the sharing scheme of the payment of compensation between users and producers (ii) the nature of their cares (complements or substitutes). The latest AI Liability Directive from the European Parliament in the field of medicine advocates the implementation of a strict liability regime for producers and a fault liability regime for users. We show that this regime is socially efficient. A novel framework is not necessary.