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Estimation of the Russia’s trade policy options with the help of the Computable General Equilibrium Model

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Alekseev

    (New Economic School/CEFIR)

  • Natalia Tourdyeva

    (CEFIR, NES)

  • Ksenia Yudaeva

    (CSR, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, NES)

Abstract

The computable general equilibrium model was used in assessing different Russia’s trade policy options. The base experiment lying in the core of our investigation is simulation of the EU eastward enlargement. According to our calculations Russia does not loose in the resulting equilibrium. This is not a zero-sum process from a point of view of Russia’s social welfare. The other experiments are: simulation of Russia’s WTO accession and creation of the Common European Economic Space. Change in the tariffs associated with the possible WTO accession is so small relative to the existing level of tariffs, that it does not give a significant change in the Russian economic environment. Significant changes are associated with the creation of the CEES as a free trade area between Russia and the enlarged Europe. If an FTA agreement will cover all goods and services, this will give a negative effect on the Russian economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Alekseev & Natalia Tourdyeva & Ksenia Yudaeva, 2003. "Estimation of the Russia’s trade policy options with the help of the Computable General Equilibrium Model," Working Papers w0042, New Economic School (NES).
  • Handle: RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0042
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bchir, Mohamed Hedi & Hammouda, Hakim Ben, 2008. "Does theory matters in Global CGE models," Conference papers 331807, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    2. Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2009. "State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin," International Economic Association Series, in: János Kornai & László Mátyás & Gérard Roland (ed.), Corruption, Development and Institutional Design, chapter 2, pages 24-36, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. K. V. Nesterova, 2018. "Multiregional Models of General Equilibrium: Framework and Applications," Administrative Consulting, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. North-West Institute of Management., issue 12.
    4. Mr. Yaroslav D Lissovolik & Mr. Bogdan Lissovolik, 2004. "Russia and the WTO: The "Gravity" of Outsider Status," IMF Working Papers 2004/159, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Nesterova, Kristina (Нестерова, Кристина), 2018. "The Construction of a Global General Equilibrium Model for the Russian Economy Based on International Experience [Построение Глобальной Модели Общего Равновесия Для Российской Экономики На Основе М," Working Papers 021807, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    6. Pavel Kadochnikov, 2006. "An Analysis of Import Substitution in Russia after the 1998 Crisis," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 95, pages 148-148.
    7. Valery Leonidovich Makarov & Albert Raufovich Bakhtizin & Elena Davidovna Sushko & Maria Alekseevna Burilina, 0. "Development of Mathematical Model for a Quantitative Assessment of Consequences of Illegal Financial Operations," Administrative Consulting, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. North-West Institute of Management., issue 3.
    8. Benedictow, Andreas & Fjærtoft, Daniel & Løfsnæs, Ole, 2013. "Oil dependency of the Russian economy: An econometric analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 400-428.
    9. Oksana Harbuzyuk & Stefan Lutz, 2008. "Analyzing trade opening in Ukraine: effects of a customs union with the EU," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 221-238, September.
    10. Andreas Benedictow & Daniel Fjærtoft & Ole Løfsnæs, 2010. "Oil dependency of the Russian economy: an econometric analysis," Discussion Papers 617, Statistics Norway, Research Department.

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