Central Counterparty Clearing and Systemic Risk Regulation
In: THE WORLD SCIENTIFIC HANDBOOK OF FUTURES MARKETS
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- France, Virginia G. & Kahn, Charles M., 2016. "Law as a constraint on bailouts: Emergency support for central counterparties," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 22-31.
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Keywords
Futures Markets; Pricing; Risk Management; Futures Trading; Stock Indexes; Interest Rates; Futures Prices; Portfolio Theory; Hedge Funds; Foreign Exchange;All these keywords.
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