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Adequacy of the Weekly Benefit Amount

In: Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues

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Abstract

The unemployment insurance (UI) system was established to alleviate the distress and hardship caused by involuntary unemployment. Through weekly benefit payments to eligible claimants, the system helps maintain living standards during active job search. The adequacy of the weekly benefit amount in performing the income maintenance function can be gauged by the percentage of lost income that benefits replace. More directly, adequacy depends on how the weekly benefit contributes to maintaining usual levels of household expenditure.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher J. O'Leary & Murray Rubin, 1997. "Adequacy of the Weekly Benefit Amount," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Christopher J. O'Leary & Stephen A. Wandner (ed.), Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues, chapter 5, pages 163-210, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:upj:uchaps:uius2ch5
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    1. Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, 1996. "Further Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation: Background Papers, volume 3, pages CC1-CC71, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    2. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1980. "Unemployment as Disequilibrium in a Model of Aggregate Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(3), pages 547-564, April.
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    4. Grossman, Michael, 1973. "Unemployment and Consumption: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 208-213, March.
    5. William Papier, 1974. "Standards for Improving Maximum Unemployment Insurance Benefits," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 27(3), pages 376-390, April.
    6. John M. Abowd & Orley C. Ashenfelter, 1981. "Anticipated Unemployment, Temporary Layoffs, and Compensating Wage Differentials," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Labor Markets, pages 141-170, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Saul J. Blaustein, 1980. "Diverse Treatment of Claimants by States," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers,in: Unemployment Compensation: Studies and Research, volume 1, pages 187-213 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    8. Michael Hurd, 1980. "A Compensation Measure of the Cost of Unemployment to the Unemployed," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 95(2), pages 225-243.
    9. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
    10. Jonathan Gruber, 1994. "The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 4750, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Harberger, Arnold C, 1971. "Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 785-797, September.
    12. Rosen, Sherwin, 2007. "Studies in Labor Markets," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226726304, April.
    13. Flemming, J. S., 1978. "Aspects of optimal unemployment insurance : Search, leisure, savings and capital market imperfections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 403-425, December.
    14. Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, 1996. "Further Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation: Background Papers, volume 3, pages BB1-BB50, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    15. Edward M. Gramlich, 1974. "The Distributional Effects of Higher Unemployment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 5(2), pages 293-342.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher J. O'Leary & Stephen A. Wandner, 2001. "Unemployment Compensation and Older Workers," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Peter P. Budetti & Richard V. Burkhauser & Janice M. Gregory & H. Allan Hunt (ed.), Ensuring Health and Income Security for an Aging Workforce, pages 85-133, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    2. Wei-Jang Huang & Christopher J. O'Leary & Robert Tannenwald, 1999. "New ways of evaluating state unemployment insurance," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Mar, pages 15-40.
    3. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, 2005. "The Wage Curve Reloaded," NBER Working Papers 11338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Yolanda Kodrzycki, 1998. "Effects of employer-provided severance benefits on reemployment outcomes," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Nov, pages 41-68.
    5. Parsons, Donald O., 2016. "Moral-Hazard-Free First-Best Unemployment Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers 9824, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Walter Nicholson & Karen Needels, 2006. "Unemployment Insurance: Strengthening the Relationship between Theory and Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 47-70, Summer.
    7. Christopher J. O'Leary & Robert A. Straits, 2004. "Intergovernmental Relations in Employment Policy: The United States Experience," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Alain Noel (ed.),Federalism and Labour market Policy: Comparing Different Governance and Employment Strategies, pages 25-82, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    8. Grell, Britta, 2011. "Unemployment compensation in the United States: Provisions and institutional changes since the 1980s," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Inequality and Social Integration SP I 2011-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    9. Christopher J. O'Leary & Robert Tannenwald & Wei-Jang Huang & Pei Zhu, 2000. "Alternative Measures of State UI Systems," Upjohn Working Papers 00-62, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    UNEMPLOYMENT; DISABILITY; POVERTY; Unemployment insurance; Benefits; duration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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