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The Organization of Production, Consumption and Learning

In: Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency

Author

Listed:
  • Bryan Ellickson

    (UCLA)

  • Birgit Grodal

    (University of Copenhagen)

  • Suzanne Scotchmer

    (University of California)

  • William R. Zame

    (UCLA)

Abstract

Summary This paper provides an extension of general equilibrium theory that incorporates the actions of individuals both as demanders and suppliers of goods and as members of firms, schools, social groups, and contractual relationships. The central notion of the paper is a group: a collection of individuals associated with one another for some purpose. The model takes as primitive an exogenous set of group types, interpretable as (potential) firms, schools, social groups, contracts etc. The types of schools and firms that materialize in equilibrium, as well as the way that agents acquire skills, are determined endogenously in a competitive market, as are the contracts they enter into, and the production and consumption of private commodities. Equilibrium exists and the core coincides with the set of equilibrium states. Examples and Applications illustrate the flexibility and power of the framework.4

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 2006. "The Organization of Production, Consumption and Learning," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Christian Schultz & Karl Vind (ed.), Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency, chapter 9, pages 149-185, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-28161-0_9
    DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28161-4_9
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Ellickson, Bryan & Grodal, Birgit & Scotchmer, Suzanne & Zame, William R., 2001. "Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 40-77, November.
    3. Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999. "Clubs and the Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1185-1218, September.
    4. Roland Benabou, 1993. "Workings of a City: Location, Education, and Production," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(3), pages 619-652.
    5. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    6. Ichiishi,Tatsuro, 1993. "The Cooperative Nature of the Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521414449, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xiong, Siyang & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Core equivalence theorem with production," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 246-270, November.
    2. Jaime Luque, 2014. "Wages, local amenities and the rise of the multi-skilled city," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 52(2), pages 457-467, March.
    3. Luque, Jaime, 2013. "Heterogeneous Tiebout communities with private production and anonymous crowding," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 117-123.

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