IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/2005-008.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Implicit Transfers in IMF Lending, 1973–2003

Author

Listed:
  • Ms. Priyadarshani Joshi
  • Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Abstract

We compute realized transfers implicit in IMF lending from 1973-2003, based on 2003 IMF repayment projections and promised debt relief. IMF lending rates to high-and middleincome countries fell short of industrial country borrowing rates by 30-150 basis points over the period as a whole, but exhibited a small premium after 1987. The subsidy received by low-income and HIPC countries was much higher (400-600 basis points, respectively). In 2002 NPV terms, cumulative transfers were 12-15 percent of 2002 GDP for the HIPCs, 2-3 percent for low income countries, and less than ¾ percent for the emerging market countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Ms. Priyadarshani Joshi & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "Implicit Transfers in IMF Lending, 1973–2003," IMF Working Papers 2005/008, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2005/008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=17940
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Mussa, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.),Capital Flows and the International Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    2. Ms. Christina Daseking & Mr. Robert Powell, 1999. "From Toronto Terms to the HIPC Initiative: A Brief History of Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries," IMF Working Papers 1999/142, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Mrs. Lynn Aylward & Mr. Rupert Thorne, 1998. "An Econometric Analysis of Countries' Repayment Performance to the International Monetary Fund," IMF Working Papers 1998/032, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Boz, Emine, 2011. "Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 70-82, January.
    2. Hassan Naqvi, 2014. "IMF Conditionality and the Intertemporal Allocation of Resources," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 14(2), pages 203-235, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 408-432.
    2. Claudio Raddatz, 2011. "Multilateral Debt Relief through the Eyes of Financial Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 1262-1288, November.
    3. Neumayer, Eric, 2002. "Is Good Governance Rewarded? A Cross-national Analysis of Debt Forgiveness," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 913-930, June.
    4. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Country Insurance," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-6.
    5. Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 2, pages 1-41.
    6. Robbie Mochrie, 2000. "An Appraisal of Debt Relief for Poor Countries," CERT Discussion Papers 0005, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
    7. Rockerbie, Duane W. & Easton, Stephen T., 2009. "Commercial banks, default insurance and IMF reforms," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-39, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    8. Ferry, Marin & Raffinot, Marc & Venet, Baptiste, 2021. "Does debt relief “irresistibly attract banks as honey attracts bees”? Evidence from low-income countries’ debt relief programs," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    9. Mr. Barry J. Eichengreen & Ms. Asmaa A ElGanainy & Rui Pedro Esteves & Kris James Mitchener, 2019. "Public Debt Through the Ages," IMF Working Papers 2019/006, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Prasanna Gai & Ashley Taylor, 2004. "International Financial Rescues and Debtor‐Country Moral Hazard," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 391-420, December.
    11. Gong Cheng & Javier Diaz-Cassou & Aitor Erce, 2017. "From Debt Collection to Relief Provision: 60 Years of Official Debt Restructurings through the Paris Club," Working Papers 20, European Stability Mechanism.
    12. Peter Clark & Haizhou Huang, 2006. "International Financial Contagion and the Fund —A Theoretical Framework," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 399-422, December.
    13. Mark Wright & Christine Richmond & Daniel Dias, 2013. "In for a Penny, In for a 100 Billion Pounds: Quantifying the Welfare Benefits from Debt Relief," 2013 Meeting Papers 646, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Cheng, Gong & Díaz-Cassou, Javier & Erce, Aitor, 2018. "Official debt restructurings and development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 181-195.
    15. Aart Kraay & Vikram Nehru, 2006. "When Is External Debt Sustainable?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 20(3), pages 341-365.
    16. A. Georgievska & L. Georgievska & A. Stojanovic & N. Todorovic, 2008. "Sovereign rescheduling probabilities in emerging markets: a comparison with credit rating agencies' ratings," Journal of Applied Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(9), pages 1031-1051.
    17. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-5.
    18. Birdsall, Nancy & Diwan, Ishac & Claessens, Stijn, 2002. "Will HIPC Matter? The Debt Game and Donor Behaviour in Africa," CEPR Discussion Papers 3297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    20. Brooke, Martin & Pienkowski, Alex & Mendes, Rhys & Santor, Eric, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 27: Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 27, Bank of England.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2005/008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Akshay Modi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.