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Recent Central-Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy

In: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10

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  • Carl E. Walsh

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  • Carl E. Walsh, 1995. "Recent Central-Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 237-252, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:11020
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    1. International Monetary Fund, 1991. "Central Bank Independence: Issues and Experience," IMF Working Papers 1991/058, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-286, March.
    3. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    4. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    5. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Jose Vinals, 1994. "Strategy an tactics of monetary policy: examples from Europe and the Antipodes," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 139-194.
    6. Waller, Christopher J., 1992. "A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 411-428, June.
    7. Michael M. Hutchison, 1995. "Central bank credibility and disinflation in New Zealand," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue feb10.
    8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    9. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
    10. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    11. Lars E.O. Svensson, 1993. "The Simplest Test of Inflation Target Credibility," NBER Working Papers 4604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Charles Goodhart & José Viñals, 1994. "Strategy and Tactics of Monetary Policy: Examples from Europe and the Antipodes," Working Papers 9425, Banco de España.
    13. José I. García de Paso, 1993. "Monetary announcements and monetary policy credibility," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 17(3), pages 551-567, September.
    14. Fratianni, M. & Von Hagen, J. & Waller, C., 1992. "The Maastricht Way to EMU," Princeton Studies in International Economics 187, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    15. Guy Debelle, 1996. "The Ends of Three Small Inflations: Australia, New Zealand and Canada," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 22(1), pages 56-78, March.
    16. Mark M. Spiegel, 1995. "Rules vs. discretion in New Zealand monetary policy," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue mar3.
    17. Andreas Fischer, 1993. "Inflation Targeting: The New Zealand and Canadian Cases," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 13(1), pages 1-27, Spring/Su.
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    Cited by:

    1. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
    2. Krause, Stefan & Méndez, Fabio, 2008. "Institutions, arrangements and preferences for inflation stability: Evidence and lessons from a panel data analysis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 282-307, March.
    3. Weitzman Nagar, 2007. "Asymmetry in Monetary Policy: An Asymmetric Objective Function and a New-Keynesian Model," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2007.02, Bank of Israel.
    4. Walsh, Carl E, 2003. "Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 829-849, October.
    5. Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-399, August.
    6. Rao, Nasir Hamid & Bukhari, Syed Kalim Hyder, 2010. "Asymmetric Shocks and Co-movement of Price Indices," MPRA Paper 28723, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Ibarra, Raul & Trupkin, Danilo R., 2016. "Reexamining the relationship between inflation and growth: Do institutions matter in developing countries?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PB), pages 332-351.
    8. Guy Debelle & Miguel A Savastano & Paul R Masson & Sunil Sharma, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Framework for Monetary Policy," IMF Economic Issues 15, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Francisco Rosende, 1997. "La Autonomía del Banco Central una Vez Más," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 34(101), pages 3-26.
    10. Muhammad Khan & Waqas Hanif, 2020. "Institutional quality and the relationship between inflation and economic growth," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 627-649, February.
    11. Barbaros Güneri & A. Yasemin Yalta, 2021. "Does economic complexity reduce output volatility in developing countries?," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(3), pages 411-431, July.
    12. Paul De Grauwe & Daniel Gros, 2009. "A New Two-Pillar Strategy for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series 2818, CESifo.

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