Dodd-Frank, Fiduciary Duties, and the Entangled Political Economy of Federalism and Agency Rule-Making
In: Entangled Political Economy
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DOI: 10.1108/S1529-213420140000018006
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More about this item
Keywords
Dodd-Frank; entangled political economy; law and jurisprudence; fiduciary duties of investment advisors and broker-dealers; rule-making; G11; G18; K22; P48;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
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