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Stressed banks? Evidence from the largest-ever supervisory review

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  • Abbassi, Puriya
  • Iyer, Rajkamal
  • Peydró, José-Luis
  • Soto, Paul E.

Abstract

Regulation needs effective supervision; but regulated entities may deviate with unobserved actions. For identification, we analyze banks, exploiting ECB's asset-quality-review (AQR) and supervisory security and credit registers. After AQR announcement, reviewed banks reduce riskier securities and credit (also overall securities and credit supply), with largest impact on riskiest securities (not on riskiest credit), and immediate negative spillovers on asset prices and firm-level credit supply. Exposed (unregulated) nonbanks buy the shed risk. AQR drives the results, not the end-of-year. After AQR compliance, reviewed banks reload riskier securities, but not riskier credit, with medium-term negative firm-level real effects (costs of supervision/safe-assets increase).

Suggested Citation

  • Abbassi, Puriya & Iyer, Rajkamal & Peydró, José-Luis & Soto, Paul E., 2020. "Stressed banks? Evidence from the largest-ever supervisory review," Discussion Papers 26/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:262020
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    Cited by:

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    2. Paul E. Soto, 2021. "Breaking the Word Bank: Measurement and Effects of Bank Level Uncertainty," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 1-45, April.
    3. Kasinger, Johannes & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Ongena, Steven & Pelizzon, Loriana & Schmeling, Maik & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2021. "Non-performing loans - new risks and policies? NPL resolution after COVID-19: Main differences to previous crises," SAFE White Paper Series 84, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    4. Das, Abhiman & Mohapatra, Sanket & Nigania, Akshita, 2022. "State-owned banks and credit allocation in India: Evidence from an asset quality review," IIMA Working Papers WP 2022-02-01, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asset quality review; stress tests; supervision; risk-masking; costs of safe assets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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