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On Machiavelli’s conspiracy paradoxes

In: Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

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  • Manfred J. Holler

Abstract

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.

Suggested Citation

  • Manfred J. Holler, 2013. "On Machiavelli’s conspiracy paradoxes," Chapters, in: Francisco Cabrillo & Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro (ed.), Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 7, pages 125-145, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14863_7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Luciano Andreozzi, 2002. "Oscilliations in the Enforcement of Law: an Evolutionary Analysis," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 403-428.
    2. Albert Breton & Gianluigi Galeotti & Pierre Salmon & Ronald Wintrobe, 2007. "The Economics of Transparency in Politics," Post-Print halshs-00187010, HAL.
    3. Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
    4. Pio Baake & Rainald Borck (ed.), 2007. "Public Economics and Public Choice," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-540-72782-8, January.
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