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The specification of the probability functions in Tullock's rent-seeking contest

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  • Kooreman, Peter
  • Schoonbeek, Lambert

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  • Kooreman, Peter & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 1997. "The specification of the probability functions in Tullock's rent-seeking contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 59-61, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:56:y:1997:i:1:p:59-61
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yang, Chun-Lei, 1994. "A simple extension of the Dasgupta-Maskin existence theorem for discontinuous games with an application to the theory of rent-seeking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 181-183, June.
    2. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    3. Leininger, Wolfgang, 1993. "More Efficient Rent-Seeking--A Munchhausen Solution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 43-62, January.
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