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The Role of Economic Incentives in Improving the Quality of Mental Health Care

In: The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition

Author

Listed:
  • Susan L. Ettner
  • Michael Schoenbaum
  • Jessica A. Williams

Abstract

This comprehensive collection brings together more than 50 contributions from some of the most influential researchers in health economics. It authoritatively covers theoretical and empirical issues in health economics, with a balanced range of material on equity and efficiency in health care systems, health technology assessment and issues of concern for developing countries. This thoroughly revised second edition is expanded to include four new chapters, while all existing chapters have been extensively updated.

Suggested Citation

  • Susan L. Ettner & Michael Schoenbaum & Jessica A. Williams, 2012. "The Role of Economic Incentives in Improving the Quality of Mental Health Care," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 28, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14021_28
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    2. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
    3. Andrew M. Jones (ed.), 2012. "The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14021.
    4. Andrew M. Jones (ed.), 2006. "The Elgar Companion to Health Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3572.
    5. Kathleen J. Mullen & Richard G. Frank & Meredith B. Rosenthal, 2010. "Can you get what you pay for? Pay‐for‐performance and the quality of healthcare providers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 64-91, March.
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