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Universal service auctions in liberalized postal markets

In: Heightening Competition in the Postal and Delivery Sector

Author

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  • Joan Calzada
  • Christian Jaag
  • Urs Trinkner

Abstract

This compilation of original essays by an international cast of top scholars addresses some of the major issues now facing postal and delivery services throughout the world. The European Commission and member states wrestle with the problem of how to implement the scheduled liberalization of these sectors and maintain the universal service obligation while the United States Postal Service is coming to terms with the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act. In addition, the book addresses the impact of electronic competition as well as other problems facing the field.

Suggested Citation

  • Joan Calzada & Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2010. "Universal service auctions in liberalized postal markets," Chapters, in: Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer (ed.), Heightening Competition in the Postal and Delivery Sector, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13672_17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. del Sol, Patricio, 2002. "Responses to electricity liberalization: the regional strategy of a Chilean generator," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 437-446, April.
    2. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
    3. Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, 2005. "Competition, Universal Service and the Graveyard Spiral," Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, in: Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer (ed.), Regulatory and Economic Challenges in the Postal and Delivery Sector, chapter 0, pages 1-30, Springer.
    4. C. Jaag & U. Trinkner, 2009. "Tendering Universal Service Obligations in Liberalized Network Industries," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 10(4), pages 313-333, December.
    5. Eduardo M. R. A. Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2001. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 993-1020, October.
    6. Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. "The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-355, Summer.
    7. David A. Hensher & Ian P. Wallis, 2005. "Competitive Tendering as a Contracting Mechanism for Subsidising Transport: The Bus Experience," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 39(3), pages 295-322, September.
    8. Borrmann Jörg, 2004. "Franchise Bidding for Postal Services in Rural Regions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-22, April.
    9. Mathisen, Terje Andreas & Solvoll, Gisle, 2008. "Competitive tendering and structural changes: An example from the bus industry," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11, January.
    10. Harstad, Ronald M & Crew, Michael A, 1999. "Franchise Bidding without Holdups: Utility Regulation with Efficient Pricing and Choice of Provider," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 141-163, March.
    11. Bjorn Wellenius, 2002. "Closing the Gap in Access to Rural Communications : Chile 1995-2002," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 14058.
    12. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
    13. Björn Wellenius, 1997. "Extending Telecommunications Service to Rural Areas-The Chilean Experience : Awarding Subsidies Through Competitive Bidding," World Bank Publications - Reports 11593, The World Bank Group.
    14. Peha, Jon M., 1999. "Tradable universal service obligations," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 363-374, June.
    15. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    16. Sorana, Valter, 2000. "Auctions for Universal Service Subsidies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 33-58, July.
    17. Cox, James C & Isaac, R Mark, 1984. "In Search of the Winner's Curse," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(4), pages 579-592, October.
    18. Panzar, John C., 2000. "A methodology for measuring the costs of universal service obligations," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 211-220, September.
    19. Michael Klein, 1998. "Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse," World Bank Publications - Reports 11525, The World Bank Group.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Jaag & Martin Koller & Urs Trinkner, 2009. "Calculating the Cost of the Universal Service Obligation: The Need for a Global Approach," Chapters, in: Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer (ed.), Progress in the Competitive Agenda in the Postal and Delivery Sector, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Sörries, Bernd & Nett, Lorenz & Wissner, Matthias, 2020. "Die Negativauktion als ein Instrument zur Versorgung weißer Flecken mit Mobilfunkdiensten," WIK Discussion Papers 463, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    3. Carlos Costa, 2012. "On the Use of Reverse Auctions to Designate Universal Postal Service Providers," Chapters, in: Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer (ed.), Multi-Modal Competition and the Future of Mail, chapter 21, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Matthias Finger & Christian Jaag & Markus Lang & Martin Lutzenberger & Urs Trinkner, 2009. "Bestimmung des Regulierungsbedarfs aus ökonomischer Sicht: Angemessenheit und Folgen einer funktionalen oder strukturellen Trennung von Swisscom," Studies and Reports, Swiss Economics, pages 1-92, February.

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    Keywords

    Economics and Finance;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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