Highway franchising and real estate values
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- Engel, Eduardo M.R.A. & Fischer, Ronald & Galetovic, Alexander, 2002. "Highway Franchising and Real Estate Values," Center Discussion Papers 28523, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Highway Franchising and Real Estate Values," Documentos de Trabajo 120, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Highway Franchising and Real Estate Values," Working Papers 840, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Highway Franchising and Real Estate Values," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1354, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Highway Franchising and Real Estate Values," NBER Working Papers 8803, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "How to Auction an Essential Facility When Underhand Integration Is Possible," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1353, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2001. "How to Auction an Essential Facility When Underhand Integration is Possible," NBER Working Papers 8146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Karolien De Bruyne & Jan Van Hove, 2013.
"Explaining the spatial variation in housing prices: an economic geography approach,"
Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(13), pages 1673-1689, May.
- Karolien De Bruyne & Jan Van Hove, 2000. "Explaining Spatial Variation in Housing Prices: An Economic Geography Approach," Regional and Urban Modeling 283600023, EcoMod.
- Marulanda, Beatriz & Montes, Miguel, 2004. "Desarrollo de proyectos viales y aportes del estado en terrenos," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3242, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Bruce L. Benson, 2007. "Private Policing And Private Roads: A Coasian Approach To Drunk‐Driving Policy," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 30-38, December.
- Beatriz Marulanda & Miguel Montes, 2004. "Desarrollo de proyectos viales y aportes del estado en terrenos," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 49398, Inter-American Development Bank.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
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