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The Determinants of the Regional Allocation of Infrastructure Investment in Spain

In: The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows

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  • Albert Solé Ollé

Abstract

Struggles over what a region receives, or should receive, from the budget of the central government are common to many countries. Discussions often focus on the measures of ‘net fiscal flows’ or ‘fiscal balances’ provided by the government or other actors. This unique book shows just how these flows are computed then interpreted and clarifies the often misunderstood economic and political motives that explain why some regions receive more monies than others.

Suggested Citation

  • Albert Solé Ollé, 2010. "The Determinants of the Regional Allocation of Infrastructure Investment in Spain," Chapters, in: Núria Bosch & Marta Espasa & Albert Solé Ollé (ed.), The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13466_12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Davide Luca & Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, 2014. "Electoral politics and regional development: assessing the geographical allocation of public investment in Turkey," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 1402, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
    2. Davide Luca & Andr�s Rodr�guez-Pose, 2015. "Distributive Politics and Regional Development: Assessing the Territorial Distribution of Turkey's Public Investment," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(11), pages 1518-1540, November.
    3. Lucas González, 2016. "Presidential Popularity and the Politics of Distributing Federal Funds in Argentina," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 46(2), pages 199-223.

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