Bin Liu
Personal Details
First Name: | Bin |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Liu |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pli1221 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
https://binliu1009.weebly.com/ | |
Affiliation
School of Management and Economics
Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen)
Shenzhen, Chinahttp://sme.cuhk.edu.cn/
RePEc:edi:smcuhcn (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: ArticlesArticles
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2018. "Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 291-317.
- Bin Liu & Jingfeng Lu, 2018. "Pairing provision price and default remedy: optimal two‐stage procurement with private R&D efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(3), pages 619-655, September.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Articles
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2018.
"Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 291-317.
Cited by:
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2022.
"Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
14854, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2023. "Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Igor Letina & Shuo Liu & Nick Netzer, 2020. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," Diskussionsschriften dp2011, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Paul Pecorino, 2020. "Bridge burning and escape routes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 399-414, September.
- Name Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2024. "Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
- Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
- Andrzej Baranski & Sumit Goel, 2024. "Contest design with a finite type-space: A unifying approach," Papers 2410.04970, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Aner Sela & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2024. "Carrots and sticks: collaboration of taxation and subsidies in contests," Working Papers 2407, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Ginzburg, Boris, 2019.
"A Simple Model of Competitive Testing,"
MPRA Paper
94605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 99463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2020. "Performance-maximizing large contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
- Boyarchenko, Svetlana, 2021. "Inefficiency of sponsored research," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
- Mengxi Zhang, 2023. "Optimal Contests with Incomplete Information and Convex Effort Costs," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_156v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Feng, Xin & Jiao, Qian & Kuang, Zhonghong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2024. "Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
- Xiao, Jun, 2023. "Ability grouping in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2019. "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests with costly entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-161.
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2022.
"Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
14854, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bin Liu & Jingfeng Lu, 2018.
"Pairing provision price and default remedy: optimal two‐stage procurement with private R&D efficiency,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(3), pages 619-655, September.
Cited by:
- Lee, Jun Gon & Park, Min Jae, 2020. "Evaluation of technological competence and operations efficiency in the defense industry: The strategic planning of South Korea," Evaluation and Program Planning, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
- Huiyi Guo & Wei He & Bin Liu, 2022. "Learning by Consuming: Optimal Pricing with Endogenous Information Provision," Papers 2209.01453, arXiv.org.
- Vivek Bhattacharya, 2021. "An Empirical Model of R&D Procurement Contests: An Analysis of the DOD SBIR Program," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2189-2224, September.
- Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zijia, 2021. "Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
- Meng, Dawen & Sun, Lei & Tian, Guoqiang, 2022. "Dynamic mechanism design on social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 84-120.
More information
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Corrections
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