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Laurent Lamy

Personal Details

First Name:Laurent
Middle Name:
Last Name:Lamy
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pla326
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:2007 Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (CREST) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement (CIRED)

Paris, France
http://www.centre-cired.fr/
RePEc:edi:ciredfr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Laurent LAMY & Manasa PATNAM & Michael VISSER, 2019. "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Working Papers 2019-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  2. Olivier Compte & Lamy Laurent & Laurent Emmanuel, 2017. "Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling? [Mercados y parcelación: ¿agrupación o división?]," Post-Print halshs-01509658, HAL.
  3. Lamy, Laurent & Jehiel, Philippe, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," CEPR Discussion Papers 11564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2016. "Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 11376, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Laurent Lamy, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides (joint work with Philippe Jehiel)," Post-Print hal-01688249, HAL.
  6. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2015. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," CEPR Discussion Papers 10758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," Post-Print halshs-01206167, HAL.
  8. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," Post-Print halshs-00840844, HAL.
  11. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Post-Print halshs-00754581, HAL.
  12. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
  13. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Post-Print halshs-00754414, HAL.
  14. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," Post-Print halshs-00754436, HAL.
  15. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564887, HAL.
  16. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
  17. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586068, HAL.
  18. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  19. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Bidder Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions : Evidence from Cross-Border Capacity Auctions," Working Papers 2007-27, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  20. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "On the Comparative Statics of the Optimal Reserve Price : A Comment on "Reserve price Signaling"," Working Papers 2007-23, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  21. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts," Working Papers 2007-25, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  22. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Individual Rationality Under Sequential Decentralized Participation Processes," Working Papers 2007-28, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  23. Laurent Lamy, 2005. "The 'Shill Bidding Effect' Versus the 'Linkage Principle'," Working Papers 2005-35, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01155875 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00754606 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00840844 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01206167 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00754581 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1172-1202.
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
  4. Olivier Compte & Laurent Lamy & Emmanuel Laurent, 2017. "Marchés et allotissement : regroupement ou dégroupement ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 68(2), pages 141-162.
  5. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 241-270, June.
  6. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2595-2643, August.
  7. Laurent Lamy, 2013. "“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June.
  8. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.
  9. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
  10. Wayne R. Pryor & Abigail M. Rymer & Donald G. Mitchell & Thomas W. Hill & David T. Young & Joachim Saur & Geraint H. Jones & Sven Jacobsen & Stan W. H. Cowley & Barry H. Mauk & Andrew J. Coates & Jacq, 2011. "The auroral footprint of Enceladus on Saturn," Nature, Nature, vol. 472(7343), pages 331-333, April.
  11. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 503-510, July.
  12. Lamy, Laurent, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2498-2504, November.
  13. Lamy, Laurent, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 390-413, January.
  14. Philippe Zarka & Laurent Lamy & Baptiste Cecconi & Renée Prangé & Helmut O. Rucker, 2007. "Modulation of Saturn’s radio clock by solar wind speed," Nature, Nature, vol. 450(7167), pages 265-267, November.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Lamy, Laurent & Jehiel, Philippe, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," CEPR Discussion Papers 11564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020. "Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides," Discussion Papers 2020-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    2. Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida, 2024. "Targeted Bidders in Government Tenders," CESifo Working Paper Series 11142, CESifo.
    3. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1172-1202.
    4. Chen, Jiafeng & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2021. "Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    5. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, "undated". "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    6. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2024. "On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 63-90.

  2. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2016. "Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 11376, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557657, HAL.
    2. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1172-1202.
    3. Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Post-Print hal-04382099, HAL.

  3. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2015. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," CEPR Discussion Papers 10758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01688318, HAL.
    2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557657, HAL.
    3. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2021. "A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1248, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Federico Revelli, 2015. "The electoral migration cycle," Working papers 37, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    6. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via Transfers with Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1126, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Felix Bierbrauer, 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit? Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und die Theorie der optimalen Besteuerung," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    8. Kennes, John & le Maire, Daniel & Roelsgaard, Sebastian T., 2020. "Equivalence of canonical matching models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 169-182.
    9. Baranov, Oleg, 2018. "An efficient ascending auction for private valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 495-517.
    10. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2023. "A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(5), pages 2517-2554.

  4. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," Post-Print halshs-01206167, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020. "Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides," Discussion Papers 2020-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    2. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01688318, HAL.
    3. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2019. "Poisson voting games: proportional rule," Working Papers 11/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    4. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Marking to Market versus Taking to Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(8), pages 2246-2276, August.
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557657, HAL.
    6. Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida, 2024. "Targeted Bidders in Government Tenders," CESifo Working Paper Series 11142, CESifo.
    7. Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo.
    8. Seung Han Yoo, 2020. "Optimal Influence Sale," Discussion Paper Series 2002, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    9. Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation [Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2149-2178.
    10. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2023. "Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 377-399, April.
    11. Chen, Jiafeng & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2021. "Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    12. Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei, 2021. "Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 155-178.
    13. Olga Chiappinelli & Gyula Seres, 2021. "Optimal Discounts in Green Public Procurement," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1983, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    14. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2018. "Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2147R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2019.
    15. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, "undated". "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    16. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2022. "Poisson voting games under proportional rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 507-526, April.
    17. Cole, Matthew T. & Davies, Ronald B. & Kaplan, Todd, 2017. "Protection in government procurement auctions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 134-142.
    18. Pierre-Henri Morand & François Marechal, 2023. "Achats publics responsables et achat local : enseignements des données ouvertes françaises," Post-Print hal-03842464, HAL.
    19. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2024. "On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 63-90.
    20. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.
    21. Agastya, Murali & Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).

  5. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Marking to Market versus Taking to Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(8), pages 2246-2276, August.
    2. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," PSE Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
    3. Audrey Hu & Steven A Matthews & Liang Zou, 2019. "Low Reserve Prices in Auctions," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(622), pages 2563-2580.
    4. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2017. "When should bidders learn reserve prices?," ERC Working Papers 1712, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    5. Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2021. "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3256-3298, October.
    6. Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions," Papers 2008.01618, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
    7. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01155875, HAL.
    8. Marleen Marra, 2024. "Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393068, HAL.
    9. Lovo, Stefano & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2017. "No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 142-144.
    10. Eda Gülşen & Erdal Özmen, 2017. "Monetary Policy Trilemma, Inflation Targeting And Global Financial Crisis," ERC Working Papers 1714, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Nov 2017.
    11. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022. "Reserve Prices as Signals," Working Papers in Economics 22/10, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    12. Julie Le Gallo & Karine Brisset & Francois Cochard, 2015. "Secret versus public reserve price in an “outcry” English procurement auction: Experimental results," Post-Print hal-03282276, HAL.
    13. Pasha Andreyanov & El Hadi Caoui, 2022. "Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), pages 1203-1256, July.
    14. Suzdaltsev, Alex, 2022. "Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    15. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).

  6. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2015. "The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games," Working Papers 25/2015, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    2. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01688318, HAL.
    3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01155875, HAL.
    4. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2014. "Strategic stability in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 46-63.

  7. Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," Post-Print halshs-00840844, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01688318, HAL.
    2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2017. "On the benefits of set-asides," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557657, HAL.
    3. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
    4. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01155875, HAL.
    5. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.

  8. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Post-Print halshs-00754581, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Ryuji Sano, 2018. "An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 101-122, December.
    2. Ryuji Sano, 2015. "Improving Efficiency Using Reserve Prices: An Equilibrium Analysis of Core-Selecting Auctions," KIER Working Papers 926, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    3. Baranov, Oleg, 2018. "An efficient ascending auction for private valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 495-517.

  9. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01688318, HAL.
    2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01155875, HAL.

  10. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Post-Print halshs-00754414, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Niedermayer, Andreas & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pia, 2015. "Foreclosure Auctions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 522, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

  11. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," Post-Print halshs-00754436, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Vohra, Rakesh V., 2015. "Combinatorial Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektas, "undated". "Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E23, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    3. Muto, Nozomu & Yasuhiro, Shirata, 2013. "Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions," Discussion Papers 2013-13, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
    5. Robert Day & Peter Cramton, 2008. "Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 08qcspr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    6. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
    7. Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 75-84.
    8. Sano, Ryuji, 2013. "Vickrey-reserve auctions and an equilibrium equivalence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 112-117.
    9. Ott, Marion & Beck, Marissa, 2013. "Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79946, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Firanchuk, Alexander (Фиранчук, Александр), 2017. "Illegal Re-Export and Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Russian Food Embargo in 2014 [Незаконный Реэкспорт И Анализ Эффективности Российского Продовольственного Эмбарго 2014 Года]," Working Papers 041705, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

  12. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564887, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.
    2. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    3. Bougt, Daniel & Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2023. "Identification of interdependent values in sequential first-price auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).

  13. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Post-Print halshs-00754581, HAL.
    2. Lavi, Ron & Oren, Sigal, 2012. "Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 439-456.

  14. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
    2. Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.
    3. Yao Luo, 2018. "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions under Restricted Stochastic Dominance," Working Papers tecipa-606, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    4. Jayeeta Bhattacharya & Nathalie Gimenes & Emmanuel Guerre, 2019. "Semiparametric Quantile Models for Ascending Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders," Papers 1911.13063, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
    5. Emmanuel Guerre & Yao Luo, 2019. "Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auction with Unobserved Competition: A Density Discontinuity Framework," Papers 1908.05476, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    6. Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard, 2015. "Asymmetric Auctions with More Than Two Bidders," Working Papers 1502, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    7. Jihui Chen & Maochao Xu, 2015. "Asymmetry and revenue in second-price auctions: a majorization approach," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(3), pages 625-640, July.
    8. Daniel Prudencio, 2023. "Productivity in Procurement Auctions of Pavement Contracts in Mexico," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 63-85, August.

  15. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts," Working Papers 2007-25, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities : Vickrey Versus the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction," Working Papers 2007-26, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities: Vickrey vs. the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction," 2007 Meeting Papers 427, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Rieck, Thomas, 2009. "Ascending combinatorial scoring auctions," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 7/2009, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    4. Sano, Ryuji, 2011. "Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 602-606, June.

  16. Laurent Lamy, 2005. "The 'Shill Bidding Effect' Versus the 'Linkage Principle'," Working Papers 2005-35, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
    2. Bose, Subir & Daripa, Arup, 2017. "Shills and snipes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 507-516.
    3. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
    4. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01155875, HAL.
    5. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    6. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
    7. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
    8. McCannon, Bryan C. & Minuci, Eduardo, 2020. "Shill bidding and trust," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C).
    9. Andrew Komo & Scott Duke Kominers & Tim Roughgarden, 2024. "Shill-Proof Auctions," Papers 2404.00475, arXiv.org.
    10. Onur A. Koska & Ilke Onur & Frank Stähler, 2017. "The Economics of Vendor Bids," ERC Working Papers 1711, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    11. Nikitkov, Alexey & Bay, Darlene, 2015. "Shill bidding: Empirical evidence of its effectiveness and likelihood of detection in online auction systems," International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 42-54.
    12. Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim & Wu, Tingting, 2022. "Shill bidding and information in eBay auctions: A Laboratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 341-360.

Articles

  1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 241-270, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2595-2643, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Laurent Lamy, 2013. "“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 503-510, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Lamy, Laurent, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2498-2504, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Lamy, Laurent, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 390-413, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

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This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 12 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (7) 2014-06-02 2015-08-25 2016-10-23 2017-07-23 2017-07-23 2018-08-13 2018-08-13. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (5) 2017-07-23 2017-07-23 2018-08-13 2018-08-13 2019-09-30. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (4) 2011-02-19 2015-08-25 2019-09-30 2023-03-06
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2011-02-19 2017-07-23 2018-08-13 2018-08-13
  5. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2014-06-02 2017-07-23 2018-08-13
  6. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (3) 2015-08-25 2017-07-23 2018-08-13
  7. NEP-CIS: Confederation of Independent States (2) 2011-02-19 2011-02-19
  8. NEP-ECM: Econometrics (2) 2016-07-23 2019-09-30

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