Report NEP-DES-2019-09-30

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence Reading Mechanisms," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-02302036, HAL.
• Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé Iehlé, 2019. "Two-Sided Matching with (almost) One-Sided Preferences," Post-Print halshs-01513384, HAL.
• Christopher Kah & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl, 2019. "Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core," Working Papers 1115, Barcelona School of Economics.
• T. Erber & M. J. Frank, 2019. "Arrow, Hausdorff, and Ambiguities in the Choice of Preferred States in Complex Systems," Papers 1909.07771, arXiv.org.
• Laurent LAMY & Manasa PATNAM & Michael VISSER, 2019. "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Working Papers 2019-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
• Pascal Frömel, 2019. "An Auction-Based Perspective on Takeovers of Real Estate Investment Trusts," ERES eres2019_217, European Real Estate Society (ERES).