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Ville Pentti Korpela

Personal Details

First Name:Ville
Middle Name:
Last Name:Korpela
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pko562
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Taloustieteen laitos
Turun Kauppakorkeakoulu
Turun Yliopisto

Turku, Finland
http://www.tse.fi/FI/yksikot/laitoksetjaaineet/ktt/
RePEc:edi:kttsefi (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2022. "Implementation in vNM Stable Set," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0283, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  2. Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers 660, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  3. Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers 640, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  4. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2021. "An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs," FEEM Working Papers 311054, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  5. R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2021. "Iterative Monotonicity Is Equivalent To Strict Group Monotonicity : A Direct Proof," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 21-A003, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  6. T Hayashi & R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2020. "Behavioral Strong Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 20-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  7. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Mechanism design with farsighted agents," MPRA Paper 94436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019. "Implementation with foresighted agents," MPRA Paper 102496, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019. "Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions?," MPRA Paper 91474, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Korpela Ville, 2016. "Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry," Discussion Papers 108, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  11. Korpela Ville, 2016. "Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility," Discussion Papers 110, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  12. Ville Korpela, 2014. "All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying," Discussion Papers 95, Aboa Centre for Economics.

Articles

  1. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2024. "Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 77-102.
  2. Ville Korpela, 2023. "Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(4), pages 993-1007, December.
  3. T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Behavioral strong implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
  4. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2021. "Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 202-212.
  5. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020. "Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  6. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2020. "Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 108-116.
  7. Korpela, Ville, 2018. "Procedurally fair implementation under complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 25-31.
  8. Ville Korpela, 2017. "All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(2), pages 376-393, June.
  9. Ville Korpela, 2014. "Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 647-658, October.
  10. Korpela, Ville, 2013. "A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2183-2193.
  11. Ville Korpela, 2012. "Implementation without rationality assumptions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 189-203, February.
  12. Korpela, Ville, 2010. "Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 283-285, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers 660, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

    Cited by:

    1. Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers 660, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    2. Michele Lombardi & Ritesh Jain & Antonio Penta, 2024. "Strategically Robust Implementation," Working Papers 1461, Barcelona School of Economics.

  2. Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers 640, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

    Cited by:

    1. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2023. "On Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity," Working Papers 202315, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    2. Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers 660, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. R Jain & M Lombardi, 2022. "Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 22-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.

  3. R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2021. "Iterative Monotonicity Is Equivalent To Strict Group Monotonicity : A Direct Proof," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 21-A003, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.

    Cited by:

    1. Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers 640, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

  4. T Hayashi & R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2020. "Behavioral Strong Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 20-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.

    Cited by:

    1. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
    2. T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Behavioral strong implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
    3. Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
    4. Mehmet Barlo & Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2022. "Computational implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 605-633, December.
    5. Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).

  5. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019. "Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions?," MPRA Paper 91474, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
    2. Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Hannu Vartiainen, 2021. "Implementation with farsighted agents," Discussion Papers 140, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    3. Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo Saulle, 2022. "Designing Rotation Programs: Limits and Possibilities," Working Papers 202221, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    4. Savva, Foivos, 2021. "Motives and implementation with rights structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    5. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Lardon, Aymeric, 2021. "Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 28-38.
    6. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2021. "Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 202-212.
    7. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Mechanism design with farsighted agents," MPRA Paper 94436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Michele Lombardi & Foivos Savva & Nikolas Zivanas, 2023. "Implementation in strong core by codes of rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 503-515, April.
    9. Aymeric Lardon & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2024. "Axiomatization and Implementation via Objections Structures," Working Papers 2418, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.

  6. Korpela Ville, 2016. "Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry," Discussion Papers 108, Aboa Centre for Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Azrieli, Yaron & Jain, Ritesh, 2018. "Symmetric mechanism design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 108-118.

Articles

  1. T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Behavioral strong implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2021. "Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 202-212.

    Cited by:

    1. Mert Kimya, 2024. "Axiomatic Approach to Farsighted Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2024-03, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    2. Aymeric Lardon & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2024. "Axiomatization and Implementation via Objections Structures," Working Papers 2418, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.

  3. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020. "Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2020. "Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 108-116.

    Cited by:

    1. Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).

  5. Korpela, Ville, 2018. "Procedurally fair implementation under complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 25-31.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Bo & Knyazev, Dmitriy, 2023. "Symmetric mechanism design: Comment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).

  6. Ville Korpela, 2014. "Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 647-658, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018. "Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 682, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2015. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences," MPRA Paper 75469, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2016.
    3. Ville Korpela, 2017. "All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(2), pages 376-393, June.
    4. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
    5. Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition," Post-Print halshs-00869873, HAL.
    6. Savva, Foivos, 2021. "Motives and implementation with rights structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    7. Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-12, January.
    8. Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
    9. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.
    10. Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2022. "On the implementation of the median," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    11. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
    12. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve, 2017. "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 613-631.
    13. Savva, Foivos, 2018. "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 27-34.
    14. Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.

  7. Korpela, Ville, 2013. "A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2183-2193.

    Cited by:

    1. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
    2. T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Behavioral strong implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
    3. Jianxin Yi, 2021. "Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 279-288, September.
    4. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019. "Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions?," MPRA Paper 91474, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Savva, Foivos, 2018. "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 27-34.

  8. Ville Korpela, 2012. "Implementation without rationality assumptions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 189-203, February.

    Cited by:

    1. T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Behavioral strong implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
    2. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2014. "Complex Questionnaires," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1529-1541, July.
    3. HORAN, Sean, 2016. "A simple model of two-stage choice," Cahiers de recherche 2016-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    4. Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
    5. Mehmet Barlo & Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2022. "Computational implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 605-633, December.
    6. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2012. "Behavioral Implementation," Working Papers 2012-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    7. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
    8. Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).

  9. Korpela, Ville, 2010. "Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 283-285, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Korpela, Ville, 2013. "A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2183-2193.
    2. Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Post-Print halshs-01116843, HAL.
    3. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 20 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (17) 2016-06-09 2019-02-04 2019-07-08 2020-08-17 2020-09-28 2021-02-08 2021-02-08 2021-05-31 2021-06-14 2021-06-21 2022-01-03 2022-01-31 2022-02-21 2022-03-28 2022-09-26 2023-02-06 2023-03-06. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (10) 2019-07-08 2020-09-28 2021-02-08 2021-05-31 2021-09-06 2022-01-03 2022-01-31 2022-02-21 2022-09-26 2023-02-06. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (9) 2014-12-24 2016-06-09 2016-06-18 2019-02-04 2019-07-08 2020-09-28 2021-02-08 2022-01-31 2022-09-26. Author is listed
  4. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (2) 2020-08-17 2022-01-31
  5. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (2) 2020-08-17 2021-02-08
  6. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2021-02-08
  7. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2019-02-04
  8. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2016-06-18
  9. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (1) 2021-09-06
  10. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2014-12-24

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