Report NEP-DES-2022-01-31

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Camille Terrier & Parag A. Pathak & Kevin Ren, 2021. "From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England," NBER Working Papers 29600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2021. "School Choice and Loss Aversion," CESifo Working Paper Series 9479, CESifo.
• Yun Liu, 2021. "On the Equivalence of Two Competing Affirmative Actions in School Choice," Papers 2112.14074, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
• Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Saulle, Riccardo, 2021. "An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs," MPRA Paper 111126, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Harry Pei & Bruno Strulovici, 2021. "Robust Implementation with Costly Information," Papers 2112.06032, arXiv.org.
• Sam Ganzfried, 2022. "Safe Equilibrium," Papers 2201.04266, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
• Anna Bogomolnaia & Hervé Moulin & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2021. "On the Fair Division of a Random Object," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03507995, HAL.
• Benjamin Balzer & Johannes Schneider, 2022. "Mechanism Design with Informational Punishment," Papers 2201.01149, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.