Report NEP-DES-2021-02-08

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Georgy Artemov, 2021. "Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition," Papers 2101.06885, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
• Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2021. "Strategy-proof Allocation of Indivisible Goods when Preferences are Single-peaked," MPRA Paper 105320, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Vijay V. Vazirani, 2021. "The General Graph Matching Game: Approximate Core," Papers 2101.07390, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
• Takaaki Abe, 2020. "Stable Coalition Structures and Power Indices for Majority Voting," Working Papers 2015, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
• Maximilian Mordig & Riccardo Della Vecchia & Nicol`o Cesa-Bianchi & Bernhard Scholkopf, 2021. "Two-Sided Matching Markets in the ELLIS 2020 PhD Program," Papers 2101.12080, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
• Philipp Harfst & Damien Bol & Jean-François Laslier, 2021. "Designing Preference Voting," Post-Print halshs-03033239, HAL.
• Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021. "Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 8863, CESifo.
• Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Hannu Vartiainen, 2021. "Implementation with farsighted agents," Discussion Papers 140, Aboa Centre for Economics.