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Edoardo Grillo

Personal Details

First Name:Edoardo
Middle Name:
Last Name:Grillo
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pgr447
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/edoardogrillo/
Terminal Degree:2012 Department of Economics; Princeton University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali "Marco Fanno"
Università degli Studi di Padova

Padova, Italy
https://www.economia.unipd.it/
RePEc:edi:dspadit (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Nicolò, 2022. "Learning it the hard way: Conflicts, economic sanctions and military aids," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0284, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  2. Dino Gerardi & Edoardo Grillo & Ignacio Monzón, 2022. "The Perils of Friendly Oversight," Working Papers 122, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  3. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2022. "Legitimize through Endorsement," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 680 JEL Classification: C, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  4. Avidit Acharya & Edoardo Grillo & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Dynamic Campaign Spending," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 601, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  5. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2016. "Economic and Class Voting in a Model of Redistribution with Social Concerns," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 448, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  6. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2015. "A Model of Educational Investment and Social Status," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 405, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  7. Avidit Acharya & Edoardo Grillo, 2014. "War with Crazy Types," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 356, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  8. Edoardo Grillo, 2014. "Reference Dependence and Politicians' Credibility," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 353, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  9. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Penta, 2008. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 340, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

Articles

  1. Gerardi, Dino & Grillo, Edoardo & Monzón, Ignacio, 2022. "The perils of friendly oversight," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  2. Carlo de Bassa & Edoardo Grillo & Francesco Passarelli, 2021. "Sanctions and incentives to repudiate external debt," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(2), pages 198-224, April.
  3. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2020. "Economic and Social-Class Voting in a Model of Redistribution with Social Concerns," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(6), pages 3140-3172.
  4. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2019. "A Model of Educational Investment, Social Concerns, and Inequality," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(4), pages 1620-1646, October.
  5. Acharya, Avidit & Grillo Edoardo, 2019. "A Behavioral Foundation for Audience Costs," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 14(2), pages 159-190, April.
  6. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
  7. Acharya, Avidit & Grillo, Edoardo, 2015. "War with Crazy Types," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 281-307, May.
  8. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio, 2011. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-40, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dino Gerardi & Edoardo Grillo & Ignacio Monzón, 2022. "The Perils of Friendly Oversight," Working Papers 122, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).

    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2022. "Legitimize through Endorsement," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 680 JEL Classification: C, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    2. Popov, Sergey V, 2022. "Tactical Refereeing and Signaling by Publishing," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2022/14, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.

  2. Avidit Acharya & Edoardo Grillo & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Dynamic Campaign Spending," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 601, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    Cited by:

    1. Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2021. "It Takes Money to Make MPs: Evidence from 150 Years of British Campaign Spending," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03384143, HAL.
    2. Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2021. "It Takes Money to Make MPs: Evidence from 150 Years of British Campaign Spending," Working Papers hal-03384143, HAL.
    3. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2019. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393084, HAL.
    4. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2022. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," Post-Print hal-03389172, HAL.
    5. Cagé, Julia & Bekkouche, Yasmine, 2018. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," CEPR Discussion Papers 12614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Andrew T Little, 2023. "Bayesian explanations for persuasion," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 147-181, July.
    7. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2022. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03389172, HAL.

  3. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2016. "Economic and Class Voting in a Model of Redistribution with Social Concerns," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 448, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    Cited by:

    1. Armbruster, Stephanie, 2020. "The fair-minded rich and healthy? (Youth) unemployment, inequality and fairness concerns in preferences for redistribution," Working papers 2020/02, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    2. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Wage inequality, labor income taxes, and the notion of social status," Economics Discussion Papers 2018-41, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt & Holger Gerhardt & Gerhard Riener & Frederik Schwerter & Louis Strang, 2022. "Concentration Bias in Intertemporal Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(3), pages 1314-1334.
    4. Gallice, Andrea, 2018. "Social status, preferences for redistribution and optimal taxation: A survey," Economics Discussion Papers 2018-31, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2019. "A Model of Educational Investment, Social Concerns, and Inequality," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(4), pages 1620-1646, October.
    6. Ferrari, Luca, 2018. "Social limits to redistribution and conspicuous norms," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 12, pages 1-21.
    7. Kim, Duk Gyoo, 2019. "Positional concern and low demand for redistribution of the poor," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 27-38.

  4. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2015. "A Model of Educational Investment and Social Status," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 405, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    Cited by:

    1. Gallice, Andrea, 2018. "Social status, preferences for redistribution and optimal taxation: A survey," Economics Discussion Papers 2018-31, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Ferrari, Luca, 2018. "Social limits to redistribution and conspicuous norms," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 12, pages 1-21.

  5. Avidit Acharya & Edoardo Grillo, 2014. "War with Crazy Types," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 356, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    Cited by:

    1. Sambuddha Ghosh & Gabriele Gratton & Caixia Shen, 2019. "Intimidation: Linking Negotiation And Conflict," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1589-1618, November.
    2. Allan Dafoe & Remco Zwetsloot & Matthew Cebul, 2021. "Reputations for Resolve and Higher-Order Beliefs in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(7-8), pages 1378-1404, August.
    3. Yuleng Zeng, 2021. "Biding time versus timely retreat: Asymmetric dependence, issue salience, and conflict duration," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(4), pages 719-733, July.
    4. Casey Crisman-Cox, 2022. "Democracy, reputation for resolve, and civil conflict," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(3), pages 382-394, May.
    5. Basak, Deepal, 2023. "Bargaining under almost complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).

  6. Edoardo Grillo, 2014. "Reference Dependence and Politicians' Credibility," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 353, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniele Pennesi, 2013. "Endogenous Status Quo," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 314, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    2. Francesco Passarelli & Guido Tabellini, 2013. "Emotions and Political Unrest," CESifo Working Paper Series 4165, CESifo.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Francesco Passarelli, 2015. "Loss Aversion in Politics," NBER Working Papers 21077, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Edoardo Grillo, 2013. "Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 331, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

  7. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Penta, 2008. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 340, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2014. "Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1973R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2015.
    2. Aviad Heifetz & Willemien Kets, 2013. "Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naiveté," Discussion Papers 1573, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness," Working Papers 086_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    4. De Magistris, Enrico, 2024. "Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 126-140.
    5. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio, 2011. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-40, March.
    6. Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    7. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1772, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    8. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Gabriele Beneduci & Pietro Tebaldi, 2017. "Interactive Epistemology in Simple Dynamic Games with a Continuum of Strategies," Working Papers 602, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    9. Robles Jack & Shimoji Makoto, 2012. "On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-21, May.
    10. Antonio Penta & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2019. "Rationalizability, observability and common knowledge," Economics Working Papers 1662, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    11. Giuseppe Cappelletti, 2010. "A note on rationalizability and restrictions on belief," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 757, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    12. Willemien Kets, 2014. "Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play in Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1569, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Manili, Julien, 2024. "Order independence for rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 152-160.
    14. Catonini, Emiliano & De Vito, Nicodemo, 2024. "Cautious belief and iterated admissibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    15. ,, 2013. "Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    16. Yildiz, Muhamet, 2015. "Invariance to representation of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 142-156.
    17. ,, 2013. "On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    18. Catonini, Emiliano & Penta, Antonio, 2022. "Backward Induction Reasoning beyond Backward Induction," TSE Working Papers 22-1298, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    19. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
    20. Francesco Cerigioni & Fabrizio Germano & Pedro Rey-Biel & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2019. "Higher orders of rationality and the structure of games," Economics Working Papers 1672, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    21. Lee, Byung Soo, 2016. "Admissibility and assumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 42-72.
    22. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
    23. Germano, Fabrizio & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2015. "Bounded Rationality and Correlated Equilibria," Working Papers 2072/260959, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    24. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    25. Du, Songzi, 2012. "Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 74-87.
    26. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
    27. Kets, Willemien & Kager, Wouter & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2021. "The Value of a Coordination Game," SocArXiv ymzrd, Center for Open Science.
    28. Astrid Gamba, 2011. "On the Evolution of Preferences," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-032, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    29. Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Informational robustness of common belief in rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 592-597.
    30. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
    31. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi & Antonio Penta, 2024. "Strategically Robust Implementation," Working Papers 1461, Barcelona School of Economics.
    32. Emiliano Catonini & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Backward Induction Reasoning beyond Backward Induction," Working Papers 1315, Barcelona School of Economics.
    33. Yamashita, Takuro, 2015. "Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 267-279.
    34. Safronov, Mikhail, 2018. "Coalition-proof full efficient implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 659-677.
    35. Emiliano Cantonini & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Backward induction reasoning beyond backward induction," Economics Working Papers 1815, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

Articles

  1. Gerardi, Dino & Grillo, Edoardo & Monzón, Ignacio, 2022. "The perils of friendly oversight," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Carlo de Bassa & Edoardo Grillo & Francesco Passarelli, 2021. "Sanctions and incentives to repudiate external debt," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(2), pages 198-224, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Nicolò, 2022. "Learning it the hard way: Conflicts, economic sanctions and military aids," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0284, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".

  3. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2020. "Economic and Social-Class Voting in a Model of Redistribution with Social Concerns," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(6), pages 3140-3172.

    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2022. "Legitimize through Endorsement," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 680 JEL Classification: C, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    2. Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt & Holger Gerhardt & Gerhard Riener & Frederik Schwerter & Louis Strang, 2022. "Concentration Bias in Intertemporal Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(3), pages 1314-1334.

  4. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2019. "A Model of Educational Investment, Social Concerns, and Inequality," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(4), pages 1620-1646, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2020. "When today’s rewards are tomorrow’s endowments: The effects of inequality on social competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    2. Yoshihiro Hamaguchi, 2021. "Environmental policy and social status preference for education in an Uzawa–Lucas model," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(3), pages 456-468, July.

  5. Acharya, Avidit & Grillo Edoardo, 2019. "A Behavioral Foundation for Audience Costs," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 14(2), pages 159-190, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Leontiou, Anastasia & Manalis, Georgios & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Bandwagons in costly elections: The role of loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 471-490.

  6. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.

    Cited by:

    1. Lockwood, Ben & Le, Minh & Rockey, James, 2024. "Dynamic electoral competition with voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
    2. Leontiou, Anastasia & Ziros, Nicholas, 2024. "“Tacit bundling” among rivals: Limited-availability bargains for loss-averse consumers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    3. Leontiou, Anastasia & Manalis, Georgios & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Bandwagons in costly elections: The role of loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 471-490.
    4. Kohei Daido & Tomoya Tajika, 2022. "Impact of Information Concerning the Popularity of Candidates on Loss-Averse Voters’ Abstention," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 41-51, May.
    5. Kohei Daido & Tomoya Tajika, 2020. "Abstention by Loss-Averse Voters," Discussion Paper Series 205, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
    6. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2022. "Informative campaigning in multidimensional politics: The role of naïve voters," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(1), pages 78-106, January.

  7. Acharya, Avidit & Grillo, Edoardo, 2015. "War with Crazy Types," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 281-307, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio, 2011. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-40, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2014-11-12 2014-11-22 2021-05-10 2022-04-18 2022-08-22. Author is listed
  2. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (4) 2014-11-12 2016-06-04 2020-01-27 2022-08-22
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (3) 2014-11-12 2016-06-04 2020-01-27
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2014-11-12 2014-11-22
  5. NEP-EDU: Education (1) 2015-04-19
  6. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2014-11-22
  7. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2022-08-22
  8. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2022-08-22
  9. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2014-11-12

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