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Johanna Goertz

Personal Details

First Name:Johanna
Middle Name:
Last Name:Goertz
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pgo315

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Department of Economics and Finance
Gordon Lang School of Business and Economics
University of Guelph

Guelph, Canada
http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/
RePEc:edi:degueca (more details at EDIRC)

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Louvain Institute of Data Analysis and Modelling in Economics and Statistics (LIDAM)
Université Catholique de Louvain (Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve)

Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-core.html
RePEc:edi:coreebe (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. GOERTZ, Johanna & MANIQUET, François, 2013. "Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Johanna Goertz & Francois Maniquet, 2011. "On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series 3457, CESifo.
  3. GOERTZ, Johanna M. & MANIQUET, François, 2009. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. GOERTZ, Johanna M.M., 2007. "Learning differences in mixed common value auctions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Articles

  1. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2014. "Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 25-28.
  2. J. Goertz, 2014. "Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 357-375, August.
  3. Johanna Goertz, 2012. "Market composition and experience in common-value auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(1), pages 106-127, March.
  4. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2011. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1464-1480, July.
  5. Johanna Goertz, 2011. "Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 547-563, April.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. GOERTZ, Johanna & MANIQUET, François, 2013. "Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Cited by:

    1. CORNUEJOLS, Gérard & WOLSEY, Laurence & YILDIZ, Sercan, 2013. "Sufficiency of cut-generating functions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Bocart, Fabian Y.R.P. & Hafner, Christian, 2015. "Fair Revaluation of Wine as an Investment," LIDAM Reprints ISBA 2015040, Université catholique de Louvain, Institute of Statistics, Biostatistics and Actuarial Sciences (ISBA).
    3. MLINAR, Tanja B. & CHEVALIER, Philippe, 2013. "Pooling in manufacturing: do opposites attract?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. NESTEROV, Yurii, 2013. "Universal gradient methods for convex optimization problems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

  2. GOERTZ, Johanna M. & MANIQUET, François, 2009. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Cited by:

    1. Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," Working Papers hal-00914887, HAL.
    2. Castanheira, Micael & Bouton, Laurent & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 9234, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Ahn, DS & Oliveros, S, 2013. "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values," Economics Discussion Papers 8983, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    4. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    5. Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2021. "Information aggregation with runoff voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    6. François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matias Nunez, 2019. "Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games," PSE Working Papers halshs-02049865, HAL.
    7. François Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2015. "Approval quorums dominate participation quorums," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 1-27, June.
    8. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
    9. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games," THEMA Working Papers 2013-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    10. Matias Nunez & Laslier Jean François Author-Workplace-Name : Ecole Polytechnique, 2010. "Overstating: A tale of two cities," THEMA Working Papers 2010-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    11. Herman Demeze & Issofa Moyouwou & Roland Pongou, 2016. "The Welfare Economics of Tactical Voting in Democracies: A Partial Identification Equilibrium Analysis," Working Papers 1611e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    12. Chernomaz, K. & Goertz, J.M.M., 2023. "(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    13. Ginzburg, Boris, 2017. "Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 120-123.
    14. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2011. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1464-1480, July.
    15. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/108675, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    16. Irem Bozbay & Franz Dietrich & Hans Peters, 2014. "Judgment aggregation in search for the truth," Post-Print halshs-00978030, HAL.
    17. Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2019. "Stress-Testing the Runoff Rule in the Laboratory," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 10-2019, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    18. Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Ravindran, Dilip & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 665, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    19. Paulo Barelli & Sourav Bhattacharya & Lucas Siga, 2022. "Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2161-2185, September.
    20. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    21. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
    22. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2014. "Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 25-28.
    23. Johanna M. M. Goertz, 2019. "A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-12, December.
    24. Ferrari, Luca, 2016. "How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 157-160.
    25. Christian Basteck, 2022. "Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 161-208, July.
    26. J. Goertz, 2014. "Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 357-375, August.
    27. Johanna Goertz & Francois Maniquet, 2011. "On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series 3457, CESifo.
    28. Demeze, Herman & Moyouwou, Issofa & Pongou, Roland, 2016. "The Welfare Economics of Tactical Voting in Democracies: A Partial Identification Equilibrium Analysis," MPRA Paper 70607, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    29. Johanna M.M. Goertz & Kirill Chernomaz, 2019. "Voting in Three-Alternative Committees: An Experiment," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-23, May.
    30. Ginzburg, Boris & Guerra, José-Alberto, 2019. "When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 52-64.

  3. GOERTZ, Johanna M.M., 2007. "Learning differences in mixed common value auctions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Yu Yvette & Nayga, Rodolfo M. Jr. & Depositario, Dinah Pura T, 2015. "Women and Men are Different but Equal: Observations of Learning Behavior in Auctions," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205699, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

Articles

  1. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2014. "Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 25-28.

    Cited by:

    1. Chernomaz, K. & Goertz, J.M.M., 2023. "(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    2. Ginzburg, Boris, 2017. "Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 120-123.
    3. Johanna M. M. Goertz, 2019. "A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-12, December.

  2. J. Goertz, 2014. "Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 357-375, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Tajika, Tomoya, 2022. "Voting on tricky questions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 380-389.
    2. Chernomaz, K. & Goertz, J.M.M., 2023. "(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    3. Johanna M.M. Goertz & Kirill Chernomaz, 2019. "Voting in Three-Alternative Committees: An Experiment," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-23, May.

  3. Johanna Goertz, 2012. "Market composition and experience in common-value auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(1), pages 106-127, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Cadsby, C. Bram & Du, Ninghua & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2016. "Goodwill Can Hurt: A theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 224-238.

  4. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2011. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1464-1480, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Johanna Goertz, 2011. "Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 547-563, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Zohal Hessami, 2016. "How do voters react to complex choices in a direct democracy? Evidence from Switzerland," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2016-01, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2010-03-28 2013-06-04
  2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2013-06-04
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2010-03-28
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2013-06-04
  5. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2013-06-04

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