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Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences

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  • Baisa, Brian
  • Burkett, Justin

Abstract

We study efficient auction design for a single indivisible object when bidders have interdependent values and non-quasilinear preferences. Instead of quasilinearity, we assume only that bidders have positive wealth effects. Our setting nests cases where bidders are ex ante asymmetric, face financial constraints, are risk averse, and/or face ensuing risk. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an ex post implementable and (ex post Pareto) efficient mechanism. These conditions differ between the standard case where the auctioneer is a seller and when the auctioneer is a buyer (a procurement auction).

Suggested Citation

  • Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2019. "Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 227-246.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:82:y:2019:i:c:p:227-246
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Komal Malik & Debasis Mishra, 2018. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Discussion Papers 18-06, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    2. Malik, Komal & Mishra, Debasis, 2021. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).

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