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Barbara Joyce Alexander

Personal Details

First Name:Barbara
Middle Name:Joyce
Last Name:Alexander
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pal342
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:1990 (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(50%) Economics Division
Babson College

Babson Park, Massachusetts (United States)
http://www3.babson.edu/Academics/Divisions/econ/
RePEc:edi:edbabus (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Arguendo Financial and Economic Consulting

http://www.arguendoinc.com
Boston, MA

Research output

as
Jump to: Articles Editorship

Articles

  1. Alexander, Barbara J., 2001. "Essays on the Great Depression. By Ben S. Bernanke. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. Pp. vii, 310. $35.00," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(1), pages 247-249, March.
  2. Alexander, Barbara & Libecap, Gary D., 2000. "The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 370-400, October.
  3. Alexander, Barbara J., 2000. "Designing a New America: The Origins of New Deal Planning, 1890–1943. By Patrick D. Reagan. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999. Pp. viii, 362. $40.00. - Civilizing Capitalism. The Nation," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 1162-1164, December.
  4. Alexander, Barbara J., 1999. "The Political Economy of the New Deal. By Jim F. Couch and William F. ShughartII. Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1998. Pp.247. $85," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 1127-1130, December.
  5. Alexander, Barbara J., 1998. "Economics in the Long Run: New Deal Theorists and their Legacies, 1933–1993. By Theodore Rosenof. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Pp. 222. $34.95," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 261-262, March.
  6. Alexander, Barbara J., 1997. "Failed Cooperation in Heterogeneous Industries Under the National Recovery Administration," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 322-344, June.
  7. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "The Rational Racketeer: Pasta Protection in Depression Era Chicago," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 175-202, April.
  8. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "Mechanisms for Rent Transfers: Subcontracting among Military Aircraft Manufacturers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(3-4), pages 251-269, June.
  9. Alexander, Barbara, 1994. "The Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on Cartel Formation and Maintenance Costs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(2), pages 245-254, May.

Editorship

  1. Palgrave Studies in American Economic History, Palgrave Macmillan.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Alexander, Barbara & Libecap, Gary D., 2000. "The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 370-400, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Mark Chicu & Chris Vickers & Nicolas L. Ziebarth, 2012. "Cementing the Case for Collusion under the National Recovery Administration," NBER Chapters, in: The Microeconomics of New Deal Policy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Gary Libecap & James L. Smith, 2001. "Political constraints on government cartelization: the case of oil production regulation in Texas and Saudi Arabia," ICER Working Papers 16-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    3. Taylor, Jason E. & Neumann, Todd C., 2013. "The effect of institutional regime change within the new deal on industrial output and labor markets," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 582-598.
    4. Jason E. Taylor, 2007. "Cartel Code Attributes and Cartel Performance: An Industry-Level Analysis of the National Industrial Recovery Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 597-624.
    5. Taylor Jason E, 2010. "The Welfare Impact of Collusion under Various Industry Characteristics: A Panel Examination of Efficient Cartel Theory," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, October.

  2. Alexander, Barbara J., 1997. "Failed Cooperation in Heterogeneous Industries Under the National Recovery Administration," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 322-344, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Normann, Hans-Theo & Tan, Elaine S., 2013. "Effects of different cartel policies: Evidence from the German power-cable industry," DICE Discussion Papers 108, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    2. Price V. Fishback, 2016. "How Successful Was the New Deal? The Microeconomic Impact of New Deal Spending and Lending Policies in the 1930s," NBER Working Papers 21925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. William Anderson, 2000. "Risk and the National Industrial Recovery Act: An Empirical Evaluation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 139-161, April.
    4. Chicu, Mark & Ziebarth, Nicolas L., 2013. "Multi-market contact and competition: evidence from the Depression-era portland cement industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 603-611.
    5. Nikolaus Fink & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler & Konrad Stahl & Christine Zulehner, 2017. "Registered cartels in Austria: an overview," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 385-422, December.
    6. Mark Chicu & Chris Vickers & Nicolas L. Ziebarth, 2012. "Cementing the Case for Collusion under the National Recovery Administration," NBER Chapters, in: The Microeconomics of New Deal Policy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Gary Libecap & James L. Smith, 2001. "Political constraints on government cartelization: the case of oil production regulation in Texas and Saudi Arabia," ICER Working Papers 16-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    8. Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
    9. Connor, John M., 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, And Anticartel Enforcement," Staff Papers 28645, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    10. Taylor, Jason E. & Neumann, Todd C., 2013. "The effect of institutional regime change within the new deal on industrial output and labor markets," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 582-598.
    11. Alexander, Barbara & Libecap, Gary D., 2000. "The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 370-400, October.
    12. Bernard C. Beaudreau, 2019. "How Roosevelt Transformed the National Industrial Recovery Act," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(4), pages 375-388, November.
    13. Price V. Fishback & John Joseph Wallis, 2012. "What Was New About the New Deal?," NBER Working Papers 18271, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "The Rational Racketeer: Pasta Protection in Depression Era Chicago," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 175-202, April.
    15. Jason E. Taylor, 2011. "Work‐sharing During the Great Depression: Did the ‘President's Reemployment Agreement’ Promote Reemployment?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 78(309), pages 133-158, January.
    16. Taylor Jason E, 2010. "The Welfare Impact of Collusion under Various Industry Characteristics: A Panel Examination of Efficient Cartel Theory," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, October.

  3. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "The Rational Racketeer: Pasta Protection in Depression Era Chicago," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 175-202, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Michele Battisti & Andrea Mario Lavezzi & Lucio Masserini & Monica Pratesi, 2015. "Resisting the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2015/206, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    2. Edwards Griffin Sims, 2014. "The Power of the Racketeer: An Empirical Approach," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 219-234, July.
    3. Andrea Mario Lavezzi, 2008. "Economic structure and vulnerability to organised crime: Evidence from Sicily," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 198-220, August.
    4. Anja Shortland & Federico Varese, 2012. "The Business of Pirate Protection," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 75, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Mastrobuoni Giovanni & Patacchini Eleonora, 2012. "Organized Crime Networks: an Application of Network Analysis Techniques to the American Mafia," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-43, September.
    6. Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Eleonora Patacchini, 2010. "Understanding Organized Crime Networks: Evidence Based on Federal Bureau of Narcotics Secret Files on American Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 152, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    7. Garoupa, Nuno, 2007. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 461-474, July.
    8. Campaniello, Nadia & Gray, Rowena & Mastrobuoni, Giovanni, 2016. "Returns to education in criminal organizations: Did going to college help Michael Corleone?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 242-258.
    9. Mikael Priks, 2012. "Competition among officials and the abuse of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 425-438, March.
    10. Soeren C. Schwuchow, 2023. "Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 469-509, June.

  4. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "Mechanisms for Rent Transfers: Subcontracting among Military Aircraft Manufacturers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(3-4), pages 251-269, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Frode Meland & Odd Straume, 2007. "Outsourcing in contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 315-331, June.
    2. Do, Jihwan, 2022. "Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

  5. Alexander, Barbara, 1994. "The Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on Cartel Formation and Maintenance Costs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(2), pages 245-254, May.

    Cited by:

    1. World Bank, 2013. "Republic of Turkey Reform for Competitiveness Technical Assistance : Fostering Open and Efficient Markets through Effective Competition Policies," World Bank Publications - Reports 17010, The World Bank Group.
    2. Rene Y. Kamita, 2010. "Analyzing the Effects of Temporary Antitrust Immunity: The Aloha-Hawaiian Immunity Agreement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 239-261, May.
    3. Chicu, Mark & Ziebarth, Nicolas L., 2013. "Multi-market contact and competition: evidence from the Depression-era portland cement industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 603-611.
    4. Nikolaus Fink & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler & Konrad Stahl & Christine Zulehner, 2017. "Registered cartels in Austria: an overview," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 385-422, December.
    5. Mark Chicu & Chris Vickers & Nicolas L. Ziebarth, 2012. "Cementing the Case for Collusion under the National Recovery Administration," NBER Chapters, in: The Microeconomics of New Deal Policy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Forsbacka, Tove & Le Coq, Chloé & Marvão, Catarina, 2023. "Cartel birth and death dynamics: Empirical evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    7. Levenstein, Margaret C. & Sivadasan, Jagadeesh & Suslow, Valerie Y., 2015. "The effect of competition on trade: Evidence from the collapse of international cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 56-70.
    8. Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
    9. Krepps, Matthew B., 1999. "Facilitating practices and the path-dependence of collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 887-901, August.
    10. Connor, John M., 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, And Anticartel Enforcement," Staff Papers 28645, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    11. Grosskopf, Shawna & Hayes, Kathy J. & Taylor, Lori L. & Weber, William L., 2001. "On the Determinants of School District Efficiency: Competition and Monitoring," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 453-478, May.
    12. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2016. "Price Fixing Hits Home: An Empirical Study of US Price-Fixing Conspiracies," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(4), pages 361-379, June.
    13. Artiga González, Tanja & Schmid, Markus & Yermack, David, 2013. "Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?," Working Papers on Finance 1309, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Sep 2017.
    14. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    15. Taylor, Jason E. & Neumann, Todd C., 2013. "The effect of institutional regime change within the new deal on industrial output and labor markets," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 582-598.
    16. Alexander, Barbara & Libecap, Gary D., 2000. "The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 370-400, October.
    17. Claire Giordano & Ferdinando Giugliano, 2012. "A Tale of Two Fascisms Labour Productivity Growth and Competition Policy in Italy, 1911-1951," Quaderni di storia economica (Economic History Working Papers) 28, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    18. Kyle Hampton & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2010. "Demand Shocks, Capacity Coordination and Industry Performance: Lessons from Economic Laboratory," Working Papers 2010-09, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
    19. Taylor, Jason E. & Neumann, Todd C., 2016. "Recovery Spring, Faltering Fall: March to November 1933," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 54-67.
    20. Jason E. Taylor, 2007. "Cartel Code Attributes and Cartel Performance: An Industry-Level Analysis of the National Industrial Recovery Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 597-624.
    21. Alexander, Barbara J, 1997. "The Rational Racketeer: Pasta Protection in Depression Era Chicago," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 175-202, April.
    22. Holt, Andrew Chase, 2024. "Monopsony power in the United States: Evidence from the great depression," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    23. Jason E. Taylor, 2011. "Work‐sharing During the Great Depression: Did the ‘President's Reemployment Agreement’ Promote Reemployment?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 78(309), pages 133-158, January.
    24. Taylor Jason E, 2010. "The Welfare Impact of Collusion under Various Industry Characteristics: A Panel Examination of Efficient Cartel Theory," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, October.

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