Stephen J. Turnbull

Personal Details

First Name:	Stephen
Middle Name:	J.
Last Name:	Turnbull
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	ptu199
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	http://turnbull.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp/
Twitter:	yasegumi

Affiliation

筑波大学システム情報系社会工学域

https://www.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp/DPPS/
Japan, Tsukuba City
University of Tsukuba, Division of Policy and Planning Sciences, Tennodai 1-1-1, Tsukuba 305-8573 JAPAN

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

Sorry, no citations of working papers recorded.

Articles

1. Masatoshi Yoshida & Stephen J. Turnbull, 2021. "Voluntary provision of environmental offsets under monopolistic competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(4), pages 965-994, August.

   Cited by:

   1. Masatoshi Yoshida & Stephen J. Turnbull & Mitsuru Ota, 2023. "Environmental offsets and production externalities under monopolistic competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(2), pages 305-325, April.

2. Masatoshi Yoshida & Stephen J. Turnbull, 2019. "Optimal provision of public intermediate goods with imperfect competition: A note," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 15(2), pages 209-222, June.

   Cited by:

   1. Masatoshi Yoshida & Stephen J. Turnbull, 2021. "Voluntary provision of environmental offsets under monopolistic competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(4), pages 965-994, August.

3. Ma, Ching-to & Moore, John & Turnbull, Stephen, 1988. "Stopping agents from "cheating"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 355-372, December.

   Cited by:

   1. Lockwood, Ben, 1995. "Multi-firm regulation without lump-sum taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 31-53, January.
   2. Ed Nosal & Bruno Sultanum & David Andolfatto, 2014. "Equilibrium Bank Runs Revisied," 2014 Meeting Papers 1142, Society for Economic Dynamics.
      • David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal & Bruno Sultanum, 2014. "Preventing bank runs," Working Papers 2014-21, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
   3. Paul Healy, 2010. "Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 27-50, March.
      • Paul Healy, 2005. "Equilibrium Participation in Public Goods Allocations," GSIA Working Papers 2006-E7, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
   4. Qi Chen, 2003. "Cooperation in the Budgeting Process," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5), pages 775-796, December.
   5. Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
      • Amoros, Pablo, 2004. "Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-434, November.
   6. Raul V. Fabella, 2013. "Moral Hazard and Cooperation in Competing Teams," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201308, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
   7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
      • Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," IDEI Working Papers 81, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   8. Mehmet Barlo & Ayça Özdoğan, 2013. "The Optimality of Team Contracts," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(4), pages 1-20, November.
   9. Pedro Rey Biel, 2005. "Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum Games," Experimental 0506004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   10. d ASPREMONT, Claude & CRÉMER, Jacques & GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
       • Claude d'Aspremont & Jacques Crémer & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 281-310, October.
   11. Amin H. Amershi & Peter Cheng, 1990. "Intrafirm resource allocation: The economics of transfer pricing and cost allocations in accounting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 61-99, September.
   12. Bernarda Zamora & Pablo Amorós, 1998. "- Implementation Of Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
   13. Robertas Zubrickas, 2013. "The provision point mechanism with reward money," ECON - Working Papers 114, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2013.
   14. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
   15. Pierre Fleckinger, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Post-Print hal-00670892, HAL.
       • Pierre Fleckinger, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00670892, HAL.
       • Fleckinger, Pierre, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 93-117.
   16. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
   17. Caleb Koch, 2020. "Implementation with ex post hidden actions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 5(1), pages 1-35, December.
   18. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Repeated implementation and complexity considerations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(4), pages 271-293, February.
   19. Raul V. Fabella, 2013. "Salience and Cooperation Among Rational Egoists," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201309, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
   20. Brusco, Sandro, 1997. "Unique implementation of action profiles: necessary and sufficient conditions," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 7024, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
       • Sandro Brusco, 2002. "Unique Implementation of Action Profiles: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 509-532, May.
   21. Jean‐Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "The Firm as a Multicontract Organization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 201-234, June.
       • Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996. "The Firm as a Multicontact Organization," Papers 95.390, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
   22. Jakša Cvitanić & George Georgiadis, 2016. "Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 309-342, November.
   23. Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed & Sultanum, Bruno, 2017. "Preventing bank runs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
       • David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal & Bruno Sultanum, 2014. "Preventing Bank Runs," Working Paper Series WP-2014-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
       • Renee Courtois Haltom & Bruno Sultanum, 2018. "Preventing Bank Runs," Richmond Fed Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue March.
       • David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal & Bruno Sultanum, 2014. "Preventing bank runs," Working Papers 2014-21, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
   24. Pedro Rey‐Biel, 2008. "Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(2), pages 297-320, June.
       • Pedro Rey-Biel, 2007. "Inequity Version and Team Incentives," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 677.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
       • Pedro Rey Biel, 2004. "Inequity aversion and team incentives," Microeconomics 0407009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
       • Pedro Rey-Biel, "undated". "Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives," Working Papers 319, Barcelona School of Economics.
   25. Misty L. Loughry & Henry L. Tosi, 2008. "Performance Implications of Peer Monitoring," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(6), pages 876-890, December.
   26. Sven O. Krumke & Clemens Thielen & Philipp Weinschenk & Stephan Westphal, 2019. "Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 337-361, March.
   27. Eichberger, Jurgen & Grant, Simon & King, Stephen P., 1999. "On relative performance contracts and fund manager's incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 135-161, January.
   28. Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological Uncertainty," Working Papers hal-00240716, HAL.
   29. Ramji Balakrishnan & Nandu J. Nagarajan & K. Sivaramakrishnan, 1998. "The Effect of Property Rights and Audit Information Quality on Team Incentives for Inventory Reduction," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(9), pages 1193-1204, September.
   30. Xiang, Wang, 2020. "Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
   31. Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2009. "Collaborating," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1695, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2009.
       • Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2011. "Collaborating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 632-663, April.
       • Johannes Horner & Alessandro Bonatti, 2009. "Collaborating," 2009 Meeting Papers 1019, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   32. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-179, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
   33. Laffont, Jean Jacques, 1997. "Collusion et information asymétrique," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(4), pages 595-609, décembre.
   34. Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1998. "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1353-1388, November.
       • Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997. "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 9711003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   35. Külpmann, Philipp, 2015. "Procrastination and projects," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 544, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
   36. ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
   37. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
       • Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
   38. Semih Koray & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2001. "original papers : Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(1), pages 5-40.
   39. Esther Gal‐Or, 1997. "Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 235-256, June.
   40. Pereira, Samuel C.A., 2009. "Ignorance in a multi-agent setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 264-266, December.
   41. Barlo, Mehmet & Ayca, Ozdogan, 2012. "Team beats collusion," MPRA Paper 37449, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   42. Sylvain Bourjade, 2021. "The role of expertise in syndicate formation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 844-870, November.
   43. David E. M. Sappington, 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 45-66, Spring.
   44. Rudolf Kerschbamer, 1998. "Disciplinary Takeovers and Industry Effects," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 265-306, June.
       • Rudolf KERSCHBAMER, 1996. "Disciplinary Takeovers and Industry Effects," Vienna Economics Papers vie9601, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
   45. Cici, Gjergji & Jaspersen, Stefan & Kempf, Alexander, 2015. "Speed of information diffusion within fund families," CFR Working Papers 15-02 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
   46. Anil Arya & Joel Demski & Jonathan Glover & Pierre Liang, 2009. "Quasi-Robust Multiagent Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 752-762, May.
   47. Arya, Anil & Glover, Jonathan & Rajan, Uday, 2000. "Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 87-109, July.
       • Arya, A. & Glover, J. & Rajan, U., 1999. "Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection," GSIA Working Papers 1999-8, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
   48. Zou, Liang, 1992. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-431, September.
   49. Bogetoft, Peter, 1995. "Incentives and productivity measurements," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 67-77, April.
   50. Tomas Sjöström, 1994. "Implementation and information in teams," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 327-341, December.
   51. Leonardo Felli & Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2015. "Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing," CESifo Working Paper Series 5343, CESifo.
       • Felli, Leonardo & Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, 2016. "Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(3), pages 279-312, October.
   52. Brusco, Sandro, 1997. "Implementing Action Profiles when Agents Collude," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 395-424, April.
   53. Brian Coulter & Joel Shapiro & Peter Zimmerman, 2018. "A Mechanism for LIBOR [Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a discriminating monopolist when demands are interdependent]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(2), pages 491-520.
   54. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
   55. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1992. "Information, Control, and Organizational Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 237-275, June.
   56. Bisin, Alberto & Guaitoli, Danilo, 2012. "Information extraction and norms of mutual protection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 154-162.

4. Turnbull, Stephen J., 1983. "Choosing duopoly solutions by consistent conjectures and by uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 253-258.

   Cited by:

   1. José R. Correa & Nicolás Figueroa & Nicolás E. Stier-Moses, 2008. "Pricing with markups in industries with increasing marginal costs," Documentos de Trabajo 256, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
   2. Flavio M. Menezes & Jorge Pereira, 2017. "Emissions abatement R&D: Dynamic competition in supply schedules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 841-859, August.
      • Flavio Menezes & Jorge Pereira, 2015. "Emissions abatement R&D Dynamic Competition in Supply Schedules," Discussion Papers Series 540, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
   3. Flavio M. Menezes & Jorge Pereira, 2023. "Imperfect competition, emissions tax and the Porter hypothesis," Australian Institute for Business and Economics DP022023, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
   4. Abolmassov Aleksandr & Kolodin Denis, 2003. "Structural changes in Russian electricity market," EERC Working Paper Series 01-016e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
   5. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2011. "More Competitors or more Competition? Market Concentration and the Intensity of Competition," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151195, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
      • Menezes, Flavio M. & Quiggin, John, 2012. "More competitors or more competition? Market concentration and the intensity of competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 712-714.
   6. Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin & Tina Kao, 2012. "Optimal Access Regulation with Downstream Competition," Discussion Papers Series 473, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
      • Kao, Tina & Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2012. "Optimal access regulation with downstream competition," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151201, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
      • Tina Kao & Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin, 2014. "Optimal access regulation with downstream competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 75-93, February.
   7. Flavio M. Menezes & John Quiggin, 2017. "The Strategic Industry Supply Curve," Discussion Papers Series 586, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
      • Flavio M. Menezes & John Quiggin, 2020. "The Strategic Industry Supply Curve," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 523-555, September.
      • Flavio M. Menezes & John Quiggin, 2017. "The Strategic Industry Supply Curve," Discussion Papers Series 584, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
   8. Kai-Uwe Kuhn, 1997. "Nonlinear Pricing in Vertically Related Duopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 37-62, Spring.
   9. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2011. "Intensity of Competition and the Number of Competitors," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151197, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
   10. Kala Krishna & Torben Tranæs, 1999. "Efficient Competition with Small Numbers - with Applications to Privatisation and Mergers," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
       • Kala Krishna & Torben Tranaes, 1999. "Efficient Competition With Small Numbers -- With Applications to Privatisation and Mergers," NBER Working Papers 6952, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   11. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2013. "Inferring the strategy space from market outcomes," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151206, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
   12. Flavio M. Menezes & John Quiggin, 2021. "Ex ante and ex post equilibrium supply curves," Discussion Papers Series 649, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
   13. Kenneth Hendricks & R. Preston Mcafee, 2010. "A Theory Of Bilateral Oligopoly," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 391-414, April.
   14. Holloway, Garth J., 1995. "Conjectural Variations With Fewer Apologies," Working Papers 225880, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
   15. Wölfing, Nikolas, 2008. "Asymmetric Price Transmission in Supply Function Equilibrium, Carbon Prices and the German Electricity Spot Market," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

Chapters

Sorry, no citations of chapters recorded.

Books

1. Mehdi Rasouli Ghahroudi & Yasuo Hoshino & Stephen Turnbull, 2018. "Foreign Direct Investment:Ownership Advantages, Firm Specific Factors, Survival and Performance," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 10942, August.

   Cited by:

   1. Leena Ajit Kaushal, 2022. "Institutional and economic determinants of Indian OFDI," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 2147648-214, December.
   2. Zuluaga Arango, Paula & Rincón, Diego Useche & RojasBerrio, Sandra Patricia, 2023. "Relevancia, evolución y tendencias de la supervivencia empresarial. Una revisión de literatura en finanzas," Revista Tendencias, Universidad de Narino, vol. 24(1), pages 252-278, January.

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