IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/qld/uq2004/649.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ex ante and ex post equilibrium supply curves

Author

Listed:
  • Flavio M. Menezes

    (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia)

  • John Quiggin

    (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia)

Abstract

A number of writers have modelled imperfect markets using games in which the strategies are supply functions, that is, mappings from prices to quantities produced. Two representations of this problem have beenanalyzed, which may be referred to as ex ante and ex post, depending on whether strategies are chosen before or after demand shocks are observed. In this paper, we examine the relationship between equilibria in supply curves derived using the ex ante and ex post approaches. We derive conditions under which a linear ex ante solution coincides with the ex post solution. These conditions generalize the case of linear demand and quadratic cost, analyzed by Klemperer and Meyer. We demonstrate that all ex ante solutions derived in this way are unique.

Suggested Citation

  • Flavio M. Menezes & John Quiggin, 2021. "Ex ante and ex post equilibrium supply curves," Discussion Papers Series 649, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  • Handle: RePEc:qld:uq2004:649
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economics.uq.edu.au/files/39771/649.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robson, Arthur J., 1981. "Implicit oligopolistic collusion is destroyed by uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 75-80.
    2. Turnbull, Stephen J., 1983. "Choosing duopoly solutions by consistent conjectures and by uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 253-258.
    3. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Flavio M. Menezes & Jorge Pereira, 2023. "Imperfect competition, emissions tax and the Porter hypothesis," Australian Institute for Business and Economics DP022023, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    2. Kai-Uwe Kuhn, 1997. "Nonlinear Pricing in Vertically Related Duopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 37-62, Spring.
    3. Tina Kao & Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin, 2014. "Optimal access regulation with downstream competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 75-93, February.
    4. Flavio M. Menezes & Jorge Pereira, 2017. "Emissions abatement R&D: Dynamic competition in supply schedules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 841-859, August.
    5. Menezes, Flavio M. & Quiggin, John, 2012. "More competitors or more competition? Market concentration and the intensity of competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 712-714.
    6. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2011. "Intensity of Competition and the Number of Competitors," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151197, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
    7. Flavio M. Menezes & John Quiggin, 2020. "The Strategic Industry Supply Curve," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 523-555, September.
    8. Flavio M. Menezes & John Quiggin, 2023. "Competition in supply functions and conjectural variations: a unified solution," Australian Institute for Business and Economics DP012023, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    9. Kala Krishna & Torben Tranaes, 1999. "Efficient Competition With Small Numbers -- With Applications to Privatisation and Mergers," NBER Working Papers 6952, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. José R. Correa & Nicolás Figueroa & Nicolás E. Stier-Moses, 2008. "Pricing with markups in industries with increasing marginal costs," Documentos de Trabajo 256, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    11. Wölfing, Nikolas, 2008. "Asymmetric Price Transmission in Supply Function Equilibrium, Carbon Prices and the German Electricity Spot Market," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    12. Kenneth Hendricks & R. Preston Mcafee, 2010. "A Theory Of Bilateral Oligopoly," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 391-414, April.
    13. Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2013. "Inferring the strategy space from market outcomes," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151206, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
    14. Holloway, Garth J., 1995. "Conjectural Variations With Fewer Apologies," Working Papers 225880, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    15. Hugo Pedro Boff, 2004. "The Supply Of Perishable Goods," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 306, Econometric Society.
    16. Newbery, David M. & Greve, Thomas, 2017. "The strategic robustness of oligopoly electricity market models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 124-132.
    17. Moritz Bohland & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020. "Technology Policy and Market Structure: Evidence from the Power Sector," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1856, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    18. Fabra, Natalia & Toro, Juan, 2005. "Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 155-181, April.
    19. Fiuza de Bragança, Gabriel Godofredo & Daglish, Toby, 2016. "Can market power in the electricity spot market translate into market power in the hedge market?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 11-26.
    20. Han, Seungjin, 2006. "Menu theorems for bilateral contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 157-178, November.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qld:uq2004:649. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SOE IT (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/decuqau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.