Tsung-Sheng Tsai

Personal Details

First Name:	Tsung-Sheng
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Tsai
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pts12
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~tstsai/
	No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei 10617, Taiwan
Terminal Degree:	2002 Economics Department; University of Wisconsin-Madison (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
National Taiwan University

Taipei, Taiwan
https://www.econ.ntu.edu.tw/
RePEc:edi:dentutw (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

Sorry, no citations of working papers recorded.

Articles

1. Chen, Yi-Fan & Peng, Shin-Kun & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2021. "The market structures in trade intermediation with heterogeneous manufacturing firms," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 501-523.

   Cited by:

   1. Fei Wang & Linwei Ye, 2023. "Digital Transformation and Export Quality of Chinese Products: An Analysis Based on Innovation Efficiency and Total Factor Productivity," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-20, March.

2. Yasunari Tamada & Tsung‐Sheng Tsai, 2018. "Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(3), pages 367-389, June.

   Cited by:

   1. Yasunari Tamada, 2019. "Disclosure of Contract Clauses and Career Concerns," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(3), pages 1968-1978.
   2. Awad, Emiel & Karekurve-Ramachandra, Varun & Rothenberg, Lawrence, 2023. "Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Battle for Credit," SocArXiv ajrey, Center for Open Science.

3. Omiya, Shungo & Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2017. "Optimal delegation with self-interested agents and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 54-71.

   Cited by:

   1. Emre Ekinci & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2019. "Disagreement and Informal Delegation in Organizations," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 11-2019, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
      • Ekinci, Emre & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2021. "Disagreement and informal delegation in organizations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
   2. Hausfeld, Jan & Fischbacher, Urs & Knoch, Daria, 2020. "The value of decision-making power in social decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 898-912.
   3. Hideshi Itoh & Kimiyuki Morita, 2023. "Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 446-463, January.

4. Tsung-Sheng Tsai & C.C. Yang, 2015. "On The Internal Revenue Service'S Service And Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 889-905, April.

   Cited by:

   1. Gromov, Vladimir (Громов,Владимир) & Malinina, Tatiana (Малинина, Татьяна), 2015. "Directions of Improvement of Russian Tax Legislation in the Part of Taxation of Capital Gains of Assets [Направления Совершенствования Российского Налогового Законодательства В Части Налогообложени," Published Papers mak16, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

5. Chen Kong-Pin & Tsai Tsung-Sheng, 2015. "Judicial Torture as a Screening Device," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 277-312, July.

   Cited by:

   1. Mialon, Hugo M. & Mialon, Sue H. & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 2012. "Torture in counterterrorism: Agency incentives and slippery slopes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 33-41.

6. Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2014. "Delegating the decision-making authority to terminate a sequential project," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 178-194.

   Cited by:

   1. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
      • Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper 90800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," MPRA Paper 90801, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   3. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   4. Fabio Römeis & Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2022. "Salience Bias and Overwork," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-22, January.
   5. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," MPRA Paper 106427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel, 2020. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," CEPR Discussion Papers 15567, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 653-669.
   6. Yasunari Tamada, 2019. "Disclosure of Contract Clauses and Career Concerns," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(3), pages 1968-1978.

7. Tsai Tsung-Sheng & Kung Sheng-Chiao, 2011. "Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, December.

   Cited by:

   1. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 116-120.
      • Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," MPRA Paper 90792, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," CEPR Discussion Papers 10249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," MPRA Paper 90801, University Library of Munich, Germany.

8. Tsung‐Sheng Tsai & C. C. Yang, 2010. "On Majoritarian Bargaining With Incomplete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(4), pages 959-979, November.

   Cited by:

   1. Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph, 2022. "Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule," Working Papers 0709, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
      • Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph, 2024. "Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule," Working Papers 0753, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
      • Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph, 2022. "Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule," Working Papers 0708, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
   2. Eraslan, Hülya & McLennan, Andrew, 2013. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2195-2222.
      • Andrew McLennan & H�lya Eraslan, 2010. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining," Economics Working Paper Archive 562, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
   3. Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose," Working Papers 111211, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
      • Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-11-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
   4. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1021, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
      • , & ,, 2014. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
      • Ying Chen & H�lya Eraslan, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," Economics Working Paper Archive 563, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
      • Ying Chen, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   5. Peter Bils & William Spaniel, 2017. "Policy bargaining and militarized conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 647-678, October.
   6. Winschel, Evguenia, 2012. "Coalition formation for unpopular reform in the presence of private reputation costs," Working Papers 13-08, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
   7. Chen, Jidong, 2023. "Sequential agenda setting with strategic and informative voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
   8. Vincent Anesi, 2018. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making under Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers 2018-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
   9. Tsung-Sheng Tsai & C. Yang, 2010. "Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(2), pages 345-361, February.
   10. Miettinen, Topi & Vanberg, Christoph, 2020. "Commitment and Conflict in Multilateral Bargaining," Working Papers 0679, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
   11. Louis-Sidois, Charles & Musolff, Leon Andreas, 2024. "Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
   12. Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai, 2010. "Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies," Working Papers 2072/151549, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
   13. Jan Zápal, 2017. "Crafting consensus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 169-200, October.
   14. Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2013. "A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting," Discussion Papers 2013-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
       • Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai, 2015. "A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 465-480.
       • Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai,, 2013. "A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting," Working Papers 2072/222199, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
   15. Ma, Zizhen, 2023. "Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

9. Tsung-Sheng Tsai & C. Yang, 2010. "Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(2), pages 345-361, February.

   Cited by:

   1. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1021, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
      • , & ,, 2014. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
      • Ying Chen & H�lya Eraslan, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," Economics Working Paper Archive 563, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
      • Ying Chen, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   2. Evdokimov, Kirill S., 2023. "Equality in legislative bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
   3. Jan Zápal, 2017. "Crafting consensus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 169-200, October.

10. Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2009. "The evaluation of majority rules in a legislative bargaining model," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 674-684, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph, 2022. "Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule," Working Papers 0709, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
       • Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph, 2024. "Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule," Working Papers 0753, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
       • Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph, 2022. "Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule," Working Papers 0708, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    2. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1021, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
       • , & ,, 2014. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
       • Ying Chen & H�lya Eraslan, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," Economics Working Paper Archive 563, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
       • Ying Chen, 2010. "Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Denise Laroze & David Hugh-Jones & Arndt Leininger, 2015. "The impact of group identity on coalition formation," University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series 2015-03, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

11. Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2007. "Optimal organization in a sequential investment problem with the principal's cancellation option," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 631-641, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," MPRA Paper 90801, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Pogach, Jonathan, 2018. "Short-termism of executive compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 150-170.
    3. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
       • Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation [Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2149-2178.
       • Iossa, Elisabetta & Che, Yeon-Koo & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," Post-Print hal-03544026, HAL.
       • Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2015. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEIS Research Paper 358, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 22 Oct 2015.
       • Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick, 2016. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," TSE Working Papers 16-695, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2020.
    5. Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2014. "Delegating the decision-making authority to terminate a sequential project," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 178-194.
    6. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November.
       • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2007. "Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Zhaolin Li & Steven Q. Lu & Jennifer K. Ryan & Daewon Sun, 2021. "Impact of Organizational Structure on Development Strategy under Equity‐Based Incentives," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(4), pages 984-996, April.
    8. Tsai Tsung-Sheng & Kung Sheng-Chiao, 2011. "Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, December.
    9. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Susumu Cato & Akifumi Ishihara, 2017. "Transparency and Performance Evaluation in Sequential Agency," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(3), pages 475-506.
    11. Elisabetta Iossa, Federico Biagi and Paola Valbonesi, 2016. "Pre-commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships in the EU: Rationale and Strategy," IEFE Working Papers 89, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
        • Elisabetta Iossa & Federico Biagi & Paola Valbonesi, 2018. "Pre-commercial procurement, procurement of innovative solutions and innovation partnerships in the EU: rationale and strategy," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(8), pages 730-749, November.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (3) 2019-08-26 2021-09-13 2022-04-04
2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2010-02-05 2019-08-26
3. NEP-EUR: Microeconomic European Issues (2) 2021-09-13 2022-04-04
4. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 2021-09-13 2022-04-04
5. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (2) 2021-09-13 2022-04-04
6. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2010-02-05
7. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (1) 2021-09-13
8. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2019-08-26
9. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2019-08-26

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