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The impact of group identity on coalition formation

Author

Listed:
  • Denise Laroze

    (University of Essex)

  • David Hugh-Jones

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Arndt Leininger

    (Hertie School of Governance)

Abstract

Bargaining and coalition building is a central part of modern politics. Typically, game-theoretic models cannot predict a unique equilibrium. One possibility is that coalitions are formed on the basis of social identity loyalty to a gender, ethnic or political in-group. We test the effect of gender, race and ideological distance on coalition formation in a majority-rule bargaining experiment. Despite the absence of any incentives to do so, we find that ideological distance significantly affects offers made to potential coalition partners. As a result, coalitions tend to be ideologically coherent, even though there is no ideological policy output. We conclude that social identity considerations can determine equilibria in coalition formation.

Suggested Citation

  • Denise Laroze & David Hugh-Jones & Arndt Leininger, 2015. "The impact of group identity on coalition formation," University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series 2015-03, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2015_03
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrzej Baranski & Nicholas Haas & Rebecca Morton, 2020. "Majoritarian Bargaining over Budgetary Divisions and Policy," Working Papers 20200052, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Jul 2020.
    2. Andrzej Baranski & Diogo Geraldes & Ada Kovaliukaite & James Tremewan, 2024. "An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(10), pages 6622-6636, October.

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    Keywords

    coalition formation; laboratory experiments; Baron and Ferejon model; legislative bargaining; social identity;
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