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Huseyn Ismayilov

Personal Details

First Name:Huseyn
Middle Name:
Last Name:Ismayilov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pis183
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Biznes Fakütəsi
Azərbaycan Diplomatik Akademiyası (ADA) Universitesi

Baku, Azerbaijan
https://www.ada.edu.az/schools/sb
RePEc:edi:sbadaaz (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Ismayilov, H., 2015. "Essays on promises, trust and disclosure," Other publications TiSEM 8e778ec1-5a46-4d3a-b9d2-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  2. Ismayilov, H. & Potters, J.J.M., 2012. "Promises as Commitments," Discussion Paper 2012-064, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

Articles

  1. Ismayilov, Huseyn & Potters, Jan, 2017. "Elicited vs. voluntary promises," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 295-312.
  2. Huseyn Ismayilov & Jan Potters, 2016. "Why do promises affect trustworthiness, or do they?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(2), pages 382-393, June.
  3. Ismayilov, Huseyn & Potters, Jan, 2013. "Disclosing advisor's interests neither hurts nor helps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 314-320.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Ismayilov, H. & Potters, J.J.M., 2012. "Promises as Commitments," Discussion Paper 2012-064, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017. "Promises and expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 161-178.
    2. Gersbach, Hans & Liu, Yulin & Tischhauser, Martin, 2018. "Versatile Forward Guidance: Escaping or Switching?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12559, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Simin He & Theo Offerman & Jeroen van de Ven, 2017. "The Sources of the Communication Gap," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(9), pages 2832-2846, September.
    4. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2013. "Deception: The role of guilt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 227-232.
    5. Ann-Kathrin Koessler & Benno Torgler & Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2016. "Commitment to Pay Taxes: A Field Experiment on the Importance of Promise," CESifo Working Paper Series 6186, CESifo.
    6. Cartwright, Edward, 2019. "A survey of belief-based guilt aversion in trust and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 430-444.
    7. Barton, Jared & Rodet, Cortney, 2015. "Are political statements only expressive? An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 174-186.
    8. Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, 2020. "Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 33-72.
    9. Kleinknecht, Janina, 2019. "A man of his word? An experiment on gender differences in promise keeping," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 251-268.
    10. Schütte, Miriam & Thoma, Carmen, 2014. "Promises and Image Concerns," Discussion Papers in Economics 20861, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Ismayilov, Huseyn & Potters, Jan, 2017. "Elicited vs. voluntary promises," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 295-312.

    Cited by:

    1. Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo & Sterner, Martin, 2023. "Bilateral communication in procurement auctions," MPRA Paper 117612, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Martin Dufwenberg & Stefano Papa, 2021. "Promises and Partner-Switch," Working Papers in Public Economics 215, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    3. Rong, Rong & Barton, Jared, 2021. "I’ll be there: Promises in the field," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 20-26.

  2. Huseyn Ismayilov & Jan Potters, 2016. "Why do promises affect trustworthiness, or do they?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(2), pages 382-393, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Adam Zylbersztejn & Zakaria Babutsidze & Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2019. "Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-02420074, HAL.
    2. Jérôme Hergueux & Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F Shogren, 2016. "Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01379060, HAL.
    3. Zakaria Babutsidze & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2019. "Digital Communication and Swift Trust," Working Papers halshs-02050514, HAL.
    4. Ismayilov, H. & Potters, Jan, 2017. "Elicited vs. voluntary promises," Other publications TiSEM 7e354b03-0fa0-4303-8a40-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Davies, Elwyn & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2017. "Pledging, Praising and Shaming: Experimental Labour Markets in Ghana," IZA Discussion Papers 10520, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Steven Schwartz & Eric Spires & Rick Young, 2019. "Why do people keep their promises? A further investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 530-551, June.
    7. Sorravich Kingsuwankul & Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2023. "Why do oaths work? Image concerns and credibility in promise keeping," Working Papers 2316, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    8. Abraham, Diya & Greiner, Ben & Stephanides, Marianne, 2023. "On the Internet you can be anyone: An experiment on strategic avatar choice in online marketplaces," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 206(C), pages 251-261.
    9. Zakaria Babutsidze & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2021. "Nonverbal content and trust: An experiment on digital communication," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-03896292, HAL.
    10. Goeschl, Timo & Soldà, Alice, 2024. "(Un)Trustworthy pledges and cooperation in social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 223(C), pages 106-119.
    11. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2023. "Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: Does Partners' Payoff Vulnerability Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 15960, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Florian Ederer & Fr'd'ric Schneider, 2018. "The Persistent Power of Promises," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2129, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    13. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Martin Dufwenberg & Stefano Papa, 2021. "Promises and Partner-Switch," Working Papers in Public Economics 215, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    14. Zakaria Babutsidze & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2020. "Nonverbal content and swift trust: An experiment on digital communication," Working Papers halshs-02483343, HAL.
    15. Yadi Yang, 2021. "A Survey Of The Hold‐Up Problem In The Experimental Economics Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 227-249, February.
    16. Koessler, Ann-Kathrin, 2022. "Pledges and how social influence shapes their effectiveness," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    17. Koessler, Ann-Kathrin, 2019. "Setting new behavioural standards: Sustainabilty pledges and how conformity impacts their outreach," EconStor Preprints 195048, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    18. Kevin Grubiak, 2019. "Exploring Image Motivation in Promise Keeping - An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 19-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    19. Nielsen, Kirby & Bhattacharya, Puja & Kagel, John H. & Sengupta, Arjun, 2019. "Teams promise but do not deliver," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-207, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    20. Cartwright, Edward, 2019. "A survey of belief-based guilt aversion in trust and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 430-444.
    21. Benjamin Wegener, 2021. "How to Analyze Communication Data from Laboratory Experiments Without Being a Machine Learning Specialist," Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, AMH International, vol. 13(1), pages 32-56.
    22. Koessler, Ann-Kathrin & Torgler, Benno & Feld, Lars P. & Frey, Bruno S., 2019. "Commitment to pay taxes: Results from field and laboratory experiments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 78-98.
    23. Joris Gillet, 2021. "Is Voting for a Cartel a Sign of Cooperativeness?," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-10, June.
    24. Gillet, Joris, 2017. "Voting For a Cartel as a Sign of Cooperativeness," MPRA Paper 82160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    25. Tebbe, Eva & Wegener, Benjamin, 2022. "Is natural language processing the cheap charlie of analyzing cheap talk? A horse race between classifiers on experimental communication data," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    26. Rattaphon Wuthisatian & Mark Pingle & Mark Nichols, 2017. "To support trust and trustworthiness: punish, communicate, both, neither?," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 1(1), pages 61-68, February.
    27. Tobias Beck, 2020. "Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202030, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

  3. Ismayilov, Huseyn & Potters, Jan, 2013. "Disclosing advisor's interests neither hurts nor helps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 314-320.

    Cited by:

    1. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2016. "The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments," Working Papers 16-27, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    2. Sheremeta, Roman & Shields, Timothy, 2017. "Deception and Reception: The Behavior of Information Providers and Users," MPRA Paper 77733, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Anastasia Danilov & Torsten Biemann & Thorn Kring & Dirk Sliwka, 2012. "The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 03-13, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences, revised 18 Dec 2012.
    4. Vera Angelova & Tobias Regner, 2012. "Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-011, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    5. Sproten, Alec & Casal, Sandro & Ploner, Matteo, 2016. "Fostering the Best Execution Regime An Experiment about Pecuniary Sanctions and Accountability in Fiduciary Money Management," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145871, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Kartal, Melis & Tremewan, James, 2018. "An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 44-55.
    7. Ivan Soraperra & Joël van der Weele & Marie Claire Villeval & Shaul Shalvi, 2022. "The Social Construction of Ignorance: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers hal-03725590, HAL.
    8. Felix Gottschalk, 2021. "Regulating Markets with Advice: An Experimental Study," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 83(1), pages 1-31, February.
    9. Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias, 2016. "Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? An experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2016-027, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    10. Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela & Lergetporer, Philipp, 2015. "Lying and age: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 12-25.
    11. Özalp Özer & Upender Subramanian & Yu Wang, 2018. "Information Sharing, Advice Provision, or Delegation: What Leads to Higher Trust and Trustworthiness?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(1), pages 474-493, January.
    12. Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias, 2018. "Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 362-378.
    13. Mia Hang Pham & Harvey Nguyen & Martin Young & Anh Dao, 2024. "Who Keeps Company with the Wolf will Learn to Howl: Does Local Corruption Culture Affect Financial Adviser Misconduct?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 185-210, September.
    14. De Moragas, Antoni-Italo, 2022. "Disclosing decision makers’ private interests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    15. Gneezy, Uri & Rockenbach, Bettina & Serra-Garcia, Marta, 2013. "Measuring lying aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 293-300.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2015-02-28

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