Winand Emons
Personal Details
First Name: | Winand |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Emons |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pem11 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
https://winand-emons.ch/ | |
Terminal Degree: | 1986 Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Fachbereich; Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (from RePEc Genealogy) |
Affiliation
Department Volkswirtschaftlehre
Universität Bern
Bern, Switzerlandhttp://www-vwi.unibe.ch/
RePEc:edi:vwibech (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers Articles ChaptersWorking papers
- Emons, Winand & Lenhard, Severin, 2023.
"The Economics of Advice,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
17840, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emons, Winand & Lenhard, Severin, 2023. "The Economics of Advice," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277611, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Winand Emons & Severin Lenhard, 2022. "The Economics of Advice," Diskussionsschriften dp2214, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Lenhard, Severin, 2020.
"Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
14369, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons & Severin Lenhard, 2020. "Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions," Diskussionsschriften dp2002, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2018.
"The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
13262, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emons, Winand, 2020. "The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Winand Emons, 2018. "The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion," Diskussionsschriften dp1816, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons & Claude Denys Fluet, 2016.
"Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2016s-06, CIRANO.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Strategic communication with reporting costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2016. "Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 11105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Claude Fluet & Winand Emons, 2016. "Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs," Diskussionsschriften dp1601, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Anderson, Lisa R. & Freeborn, Beth & Lang, Jan, 2015.
"Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10576, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Gregory DeAngelo & Winand Emons & Beth Freeborn & Hannes Lang, 2017. "Penalty Structures And Deterrence In A Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1833-1867, October.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Gregory DeAngelo & Winand Emons & Beth Freeborn & Hannes Lang, 2015. "Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence," Diskussionsschriften dp1505, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Sticher, Silvio & Blatter, Marc, 2014.
"Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10106, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marc Blatter & Winand Emons & Silvio Sticher, 2018. "Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(3), pages 403-427, May.
- Marc Blatter & Winand Emons & Silvio Sticher, 2014. "Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence," Diskussionsschriften dp1405, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2013.
"Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
9727, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2016. "Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 16-23.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2013. "Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 1338, CIRPEE.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2013. "Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts," Diskussionsschriften dp1306, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons & Claude Denys Fluet, 2011.
"Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2011s-75, CIRANO.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2012. "Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 352-360.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2011. "Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality," Cahiers de recherche 1139, CIRPEE.
- Emons, Winand, 2010.
"Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7659, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 605-620, December.
- Winand Emons, 2010. "Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians," Diskussionsschriften dp1001, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2009.
"Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal," Cahiers de recherche 0902, CIRPEE.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2008. "Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal," Diskussionsschriften dp0805, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2011. "Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal," VfS Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis 48713, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2009.
"Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2020. "Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 71(3), pages 429-457.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0904, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2011. "Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony," Cahiers de recherche 1122, CIRPEE.
- Emons, Winand, 2007.
"Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6047, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emons Winand, 2009. "Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, July.
- Winand Emons, 2006. "Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets," Diskussionsschriften dp0605, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2007.
"Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6150, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Claude Fluet, 2009. "Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 134-156, May.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," Cahiers de recherche 0703, CIRPEE.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures," Diskussionsschriften dp0702, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2005.
"The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5124, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony," Cahiers de recherche 0520, CIRPEE.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0506, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2005.
"Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2006. "Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 8(1), pages 20-32.
- Winand Emons, 2004. "Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0419, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2004.
"Conditional versus Contingent Fees,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4532, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January.
- Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004.
"The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Sheldon, George, 2002.
"The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model,"
Discussion Paper Series
26353, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
- Emons, Winand & Sheldon, George, 2002. "The market for used cars: A new test of the lemons model," HWWA Discussion Papers 187, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
- Emons, Winand & Sheldon, George, 2002. "The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 3360, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons & George Sheldon, 2002. "The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model," Diskussionsschriften dp0202, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2002.
"Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2004. "Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 496-502, July.
- Winand Emons, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0211, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Cooter, Robert D. & Emons, Winand, 2001. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version]," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt3587v9sv, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Winand Emons, 2001.
"A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp0104, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2003. "A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 253-259, September.
- Winand Emons, 2001.
"Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 2005. "Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 392-410, September.
- Cooter, Robert D. & Emons, Winand, 2000.
"Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts,"
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series
qt35j9s08h, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000.
"Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0211, Econometric Society.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2003. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-279, June.
- Emons, Winand, 1998.
"Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2041, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2000. "Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(3), pages 431-431, September.
- Winand Emons, 1998. "Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller," Diskussionsschriften dp9808, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 1997.
"Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1644, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2001. "Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 247-268, September.
- Winand Emons, 1997. "Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies," Diskussionsschriften dp9704, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 1997.
"Credence Goods Monopolists,"
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series
qt9c5508x4, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Emons, Winand, 2001. "Credence goods monopolists," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 375-389, March.
- Winand Emons, 1995. "Credence Goods Monopolists," Diskussionsschriften dp9501, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, W, 1996.
"Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
356.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Emons, Winand, 1996. "Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 1996. "Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation," Diskussionsschriften dp9608, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 1994.
"Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp9402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 1997. "Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
- Winand Emons, 1993.
"The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp9310, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 1994. "The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 479-491, December.
- Winand Emons, 1993.
"Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp9309, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 1994. "Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 261-274, July.
- Emons, W., 1990.
"Good Times, Bad Times, And Vertical Upstream Integration,"
Papers
9023, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Emons, Winand, 1996. "Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 465-484, June.
- Emons, W., 1990. "Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration," Other publications TiSEM a457817c-5eda-43c8-877a-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Emons, W., 1990. "Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration," Discussion Paper 1990-23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Winand Emons, 1993. "Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration," Diskussionsschriften dp9308, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
repec:cdl:oplwec:1060 is not listed on IDEAS - Winand Emons, "undated".
"Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders,"
American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings
1005, American Law & Economics Association.
- Emons, Winand, 2007. "Escalating penalties for repeat offenders," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 170-178.
- Emons, Winand, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 4131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0315, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
repec:cdl:oplwec:1117 is not listed on IDEAS
repec:cdl:oplwec:1008 is not listed on IDEAS
Articles
- Winand Emons & Severin Lenhard, 2022. "Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 589-613.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2020.
"Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony,"
Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 71(3), pages 429-457.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0904, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2011. "Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony," Cahiers de recherche 1122, CIRPEE.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2009. "Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony," CEPR Discussion Papers 7476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emons, Winand, 2020.
"The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Emons, Winand, 2018. "The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 13262, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2018. "The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion," Diskussionsschriften dp1816, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019.
"Strategic communication with reporting costs,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2016. "Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 11105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Claude Fluet & Winand Emons, 2016. "Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs," Diskussionsschriften dp1601, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons & Claude Denys Fluet, 2016. "Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-06, CIRANO.
- Marc Blatter & Winand Emons & Silvio Sticher, 2018.
"Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(3), pages 403-427, May.
- Emons, Winand & Sticher, Silvio & Blatter, Marc, 2014. "Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10106, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marc Blatter & Winand Emons & Silvio Sticher, 2014. "Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence," Diskussionsschriften dp1405, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Gregory DeAngelo & Winand Emons & Beth Freeborn & Hannes Lang, 2017.
"Penalty Structures And Deterrence In A Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1833-1867, October.
- Emons, Winand & Anderson, Lisa R. & Freeborn, Beth & Lang, Jan, 2015. "Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10576, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Gregory DeAngelo & Winand Emons & Beth Freeborn & Hannes Lang, 2015. "Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence," Diskussionsschriften dp1505, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2016.
"Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 16-23.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2013. "Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 9727, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2013. "Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 1338, CIRPEE.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2013. "Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts," Diskussionsschriften dp1306, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 2013.
"Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 605-620, December.
- Winand Emons, 2010. "Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians," Diskussionsschriften dp1001, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2010. "Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 7659, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2012.
"Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 352-360.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2011. "Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality," Cahiers de recherche 1139, CIRPEE.
- Winand Emons & Claude Denys Fluet, 2011. "Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-75, CIRANO.
- Emons Winand, 2009.
"Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, July.
- Winand Emons, 2006. "Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets," Diskussionsschriften dp0605, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2007. "Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 6047, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons & George Sheldon, 2009. "The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(22), pages 2867-2885.
- Winand Emons, 2007.
"Conditional versus contingent fees,"
Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January.
- Emons, Winand, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4532, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2007.
"Escalating penalties for repeat offenders,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 170-178.
- Winand Emons, "undated". "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1005, American Law & Economics Association.
- Emons, Winand, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 4131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0315, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 2006.
"Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees,"
American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 8(1), pages 20-32.
- Emons, Winand, 2005. "Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 2004. "Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0419, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385.
- Winand Emons, 2005.
"Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 392-410, September.
- Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 2004.
"Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 496-502, July.
- Winand Emons, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0211, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 3667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004.
"Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May.
- Cooter, Robert D. & Emons, Winand, 2000. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt35j9s08h, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Emons, Winand, 2003.
"A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 253-259, September.
- Winand Emons, 2001. "A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0104, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2003.
"Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-279, June.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society.
- Hopt, Klaus J. & von Werder, Axel & Zimmermann, Jochen & Emons, Winand, 2003. "Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 83(7), pages 423-435.
- Emons, Winand, 2001. "Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 81(11), pages 664-668.
- Emons, Winand, 2001.
"Credence goods monopolists,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 375-389, March.
- Emons, Winand, 1997. "Credence Goods Monopolists," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt9c5508x4, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Winand Emons, 1995. "Credence Goods Monopolists," Diskussionsschriften dp9501, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 2001.
"Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 247-268, September.
- Emons, Winand, 1997. "Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies," CEPR Discussion Papers 1644, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 1997. "Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies," Diskussionsschriften dp9704, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 2000.
"Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(3), pages 431-431, September.
- Emons, Winand, 1998. "Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 2041, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Winand Emons, 1998. "Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller," Diskussionsschriften dp9808, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2000. "Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 21-33, March.
- Winand Emons, 1997.
"Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
- Winand Emons, 1994. "Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts," Diskussionsschriften dp9402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Van Den Bergh, Roger, 1997. "12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-2, March.
- Emons, Winand, 1996.
"Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 465-484, June.
- Emons, W., 1990. "Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration," Other publications TiSEM a457817c-5eda-43c8-877a-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Emons, W., 1990. "Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration," Discussion Paper 1990-23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Emons, W., 1990. "Good Times, Bad Times, And Vertical Upstream Integration," Papers 9023, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Winand Emons, 1993. "Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration," Diskussionsschriften dp9308, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 1994.
"Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade,"
Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 261-274, July.
- Winand Emons, 1993. "Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade," Diskussionsschriften dp9309, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 1994.
"The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 479-491, December.
- Winand Emons, 1993. "The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design," Diskussionsschriften dp9310, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Winand Emons, 1993. "An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 129(IV), pages 625-642, December.
- Winand Emons, 1991. "Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 478-479, August.
- Winand Emons & Joel Sobel, 1991. "On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 375-390.
- Emons, Winand & von Hagen, Jurgen, 1991. "Asset prices and public information : An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(8), pages 1529-1542, December.
- Emons, Winand, 1990. "Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 89-104, June.
- Emons, Winand, 1989. "On the Limitation of Warranty Duration," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 287-301, March.
- Emons, Winand, 1989. "The Theory of Warranty Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 43-57.
- Emons, Winand, 1988.
"Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 16-33, October.
RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:24:y:2023:i:2:p:589-613. is not listed on IDEAS
RePEc:bla:jindec:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:247-68 is not listed on IDEAS
Chapters
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2013. "The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit," Chapters, in: Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew J. Baker (ed.), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, chapter 9, pages 175-192, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Damien Neven & Thomas Ungern-Sternberg & Winand Emons & Pierre Tercier, 1997.
"Swiss Competition Policy in the Last Decade,"
Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Philippe Bacchetta & Walter Wasserfallen (ed.), Economic Policy in Switzerland, chapter 3, pages 35-61,
Palgrave Macmillan.
- Damien NEVEN & Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, 1996. "Swiss Competition Policy in the Last Decade," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 9611, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
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This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:- Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
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Co-authorship network on CollEc
NEP Fields
NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 35 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.- NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (24) 2002-11-04 2003-03-14 2003-11-09 2004-02-29 2004-05-26 2004-06-02 2004-12-20 2005-06-14 2005-06-27 2005-08-13 2007-02-17 2007-03-03 2009-01-17 2009-02-14 2009-02-28 2013-11-16 2014-06-02 2014-08-20 2014-12-29 2015-05-09 2018-11-19 2018-12-10 2020-02-10 2020-07-27. Author is listed
- NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (10) 2009-01-17 2009-02-14 2009-02-28 2011-12-19 2012-01-03 2014-08-20 2014-12-29 2018-11-19 2018-12-10 2023-01-02. Author is listed
- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (9) 2002-11-20 2009-01-17 2009-02-14 2009-02-28 2009-09-26 2016-02-17 2016-02-29 2018-11-19 2023-01-02. Author is listed
- NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (7) 2003-03-14 2009-01-17 2014-12-29 2018-11-19 2018-12-10 2020-02-10 2020-07-27. Author is listed
- NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (5) 2009-01-17 2009-02-14 2009-02-28 2010-06-04 2014-08-20. Author is listed
- NEP-MKT: Marketing (4) 2009-02-14 2009-02-28 2011-12-19 2012-01-03
- NEP-REG: Regulation (4) 2005-06-27 2005-08-13 2020-02-10 2020-07-27
- NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2011-12-19 2014-08-20 2014-12-29
- NEP-IAS: Insurance Economics (3) 2007-01-13 2007-01-28 2010-06-04
- NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2015-05-09 2015-05-09
- NEP-EEC: European Economics (1) 2004-05-26
- NEP-NEU: Neuroeconomics (1) 2007-01-13
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