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Morocco 2040

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  • Jean-Pierre Chauffour

Abstract

Morocco 2040: Emerging by Investing in Intangible Capital documents the major economic and social strides made by Morocco over the past 15 years and analyzes the economic conditions for accelerating the pace of economic catch-up by 2040. A virtuous yet realistic scenario suggests that with higher productivity gains Morocco could double its current pace of convergence with Southern European countries. In one generation, Morocco’s standard of living could reach about 45 percent of that of Spain, its immediate Northern neighbor, compared to the current rate of 22 percent. To lay out the possible pathways for Morocco to become the first North African country to attain upper middle income status, the Book then investigates the policies that could bring about such a virtuous scenario of accelerated economic convergence. It shows that sustaining higher productivity gains for 25 years would require greater efforts at building Morocco’s institutional, human and social capital—what is also known as intangible capital. Accumulating such intangible capital necessarily take a number of different forms and the Book proposes a four-pronged approach. First, by strengthening Morocco’s market institutions for a more efficient allocation of capital and labor and international integration. Second, by strengthening Morocco’s public institutions to strengthen the rule of law and justice, modernize the public administration, and improve the quality of public service delivery. Third, by strengthening Morocco’s human capital, especially education, health and the development of early childhood. And fourth, by strengthening Morocco’s social capital through greater gender parity and increased interpersonal trust and civism in society. By placing more of a priority on its intangible capital, Morocco would be advancing a social contract based on the promotion of a more open society. It would be taking a route that is partly new, but which is also the logical outcome of many economic and social diagnoses and pressing calls for change.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Pierre Chauffour, 2018. "Morocco 2040," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 28442.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbpubs:28442
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    References listed on IDEAS

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