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Spurious middlemen in corrupt transactions

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  • Bayar, Güzin

Abstract

The first step in solving the problem of corruption lies in diagnosing its root causes and determining the underlying factors. One of the most important facilitators of corrupt transactions is intermediaries who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby increasing corruption. Even worse, there are spurious intermediaries who obtain bribes in connection with public services by pretending to have power over the issue. This deception may be carried out even if the officer providing the public service in question is honest. The simple game theoretical model formulated in this article tries to capture the mechanisms behind such deception. From the solutions of the model, certain policy recommendations to prevent such a process from occurring shall be provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Bayar, Güzin, 2014. "Spurious middlemen in corrupt transactions," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 8, pages 1-32.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifweej:201442
    DOI: 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2014-42
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hasker, Kevin & Okten, Cagla, 2008. "Intermediaries and corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 103-115, July.
    2. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 2013. "Corrupt intermediaries in international business transactions: between make, buy and reform," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 349-366, June.
    3. Arvind K. Jain, 2001. "Corruption: A Review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 71-121, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sokolovska, Olena & Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2015. "Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis," MPRA Paper 66423, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2015.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; spurious middlemen; game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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