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Political corruption and legislative complexity: Two sides of same coin?

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  • Vita, Giuseppe Di

Abstract

This paper investigates the macroeconomic impact of legislative complexity in relation to political corruption on growth rate, welfare level and income distribution. After reviewing economic literature on corruption and legislative complexity, an endogenous model is provided. The main theoretical findings of the analysis are that a high level of legislative complexity, like political corruption, constitutes a constraint to growth, reduces the welfare and determines a redistribution of income in favor of the politicians.

Suggested Citation

  • Vita, Giuseppe Di, 2021. "Political corruption and legislative complexity: Two sides of same coin?," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 136-147.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:streco:v:57:y:2021:i:c:p:136-147
    DOI: 10.1016/j.strueco.2021.03.004
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    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; Economic growth; Income distribution; Legislative complexity; Political corruption JEL classification: 043; K42;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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