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Measurement of control power in corporate networks

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  • Izabella Stach
  • Jacek Mercik

Abstract

This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods for measuring indirect control in complex corporate shareholding networks. The methods use power indices to estimate the direct and indirect control in shareholding structures. Some of these methods only estimate the control power of investors (firms without shareholdings), and only a few measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks (which means investors and stock companies). None of them takes measuring the importance of mutual connections (edges in the networks) into consideration; thus we focus in particular on an extension of these methods in this paper to measure both the control-power of the firms involved in complex shareholding structures (represented by nodes in networks) and the importance (power) of linkages between the firms as elements of a whole corporate shareholding network. More precisely, we apply our approaches to a theoretical example of a corporate network. Moreover, we continue the considerations about reasonable properties for indirect control measurement. Some ideas of new properties are proposed. The paper also provides a brief review of the literature concerning the topic.

Suggested Citation

  • Izabella Stach & Jacek Mercik, 2021. "Measurement of control power in corporate networks," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 31(1), pages 97-121.
    • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:31:y:2021:i:1:p:97-121:id:1563
    DOI: 10.37190/ord210106
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cesarino Bertini & Jacek Mercik & Izabella Stach, 2016. "Indirect control and power," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 26(2), pages 7-30.
    2. Borm, P.E.M. & Owen, G. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "On the position value for communication situations," Other publications TiSEM 5a8473e4-1df7-42df-ad53-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Cesarino Bertini & Josep Freixas & Gianfranco Gambarelli & Izabella Stach, 2013. "Comparing Power Indices," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-19.
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