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Co-Evolution Of Opinion And Strategy In Persuasion Dynamics: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Author

Listed:
  • FEI DING

    (School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, P. R. China;
    Key Laboratory of Communication & Information Systems, Beijing Municipal Commission of Education, Beijing 100044, P. R. China)

  • YUN LIU

    (School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, P. R. China;
    Key Laboratory of Communication & Information Systems, Beijing Municipal Commission of Education, Beijing 100044, P. R. China)

  • YONG LI

    (School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, P. R. China;
    Key Laboratory of Communication & Information Systems, Beijing Municipal Commission of Education, Beijing 100044, P. R. China)

Abstract

In this paper, a new model of opinion formation within the framework of evolutionary game theory is presented. The model simulates strategic situations when people are in opinion discussion. Heterogeneous agents adjust their behaviors to the environment during discussions, and their interacting strategies evolve together with opinions. In the proposed game, we take into account payoff discount to join a discussion, and the situation that people might drop out of an unpromising game. Analytical and emulational results show that evolution of opinion and strategy always tend to converge, with utility threshold, memory length, and decision uncertainty parameters influencing the convergence time. The model displays different dynamical regimes when we set differently the rule when people are at a loss in strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Fei Ding & Yun Liu & Yong Li, 2009. "Co-Evolution Of Opinion And Strategy In Persuasion Dynamics: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach," International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 479-490.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:ijmpcx:v:20:y:2009:i:03:n:s0129183109013728
    DOI: 10.1142/S0129183109013728
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Huang, Changwei & Luo, Yijun & Han, Wenchen, 2023. "Cooperation and synchronization in evolutionary opinion changing rate games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    2. Ding, Fei & Liu, Yun & Shen, Bo & Si, Xia-Meng, 2010. "An evolutionary game theory model of binary opinion formation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(8), pages 1745-1752.
    3. Huang, Changwei & Hou, Yongzhao & Han, Wenchen, 2023. "Coevolution of consensus and cooperation in evolutionary Hegselmann–Krause dilemma with the cooperation cost," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).

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