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The Rise and Decline of Mancur Olson's View of The Rise and Decline of Nations

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  • J. Barkley Rosser

Abstract

The evolution of Mancur Olson's views regarding The Rise and Decline of Nations, the second of his three main books, is examined. It expands and extends to history and to the world the arguments presented in his earlier work, The Logic of Collective Action. Although Olson never abandons the idea that the accumulation of interest groups in a democratic society can lead to its economic stagnation, how this comes about and can be overcome changes somewhat by the time of his final book, Power and Prosperity, which focuses on the problems of transition economies and proper political governance. A sign of the greater complexity of his later views emerges in his analysis of the U.S. South, presented in his 1983 presidential address to the Southern Economic Association.

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  • J. Barkley Rosser, 2007. "The Rise and Decline of Mancur Olson's View of The Rise and Decline of Nations," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 4-17, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:74:y:2007:i:1:p:4-17
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2007.tb00823.x
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