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Power transition and the regulatory state in large emerging markets: Norm‐breaking after the global financial crisis

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  • Simon J. Evenett

Abstract

I examine the ways in which the global financial crisis that began in 2007, and whose effects arguably condition policymaking to the present day, affected the ongoing global power transition as manifested by the unilateral decisions undertaken by official agencies comprising national regulatory states. The theory of that power transition articulated in the overview paper of this Special Issue is reinterpreted to take into account the circumstances of that crisis. Empirical evidence on the propensity to discriminate against foreign commercial interests by the BRICS, Turkey, the European Union, and the United States during the years 2008 to 2017 at, and behind, the border is employed to identify a group of six potential rule‐shapers and two possible sham rule‐takers.

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  • Simon J. Evenett, 2021. "Power transition and the regulatory state in large emerging markets: Norm‐breaking after the global financial crisis," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 472-491, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:15:y:2021:i:3:p:472-491
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12345
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