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RegData: A numerical database on industry‐specific regulations for all United States industries and federal regulations, 1997–2012

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  • Omar Al‐Ubaydli
  • Patrick A. McLaughlin

Abstract

We introduce RegData, formerly known as the Industry‐specific Regulatory Constraint Database. RegData annually quantifies federal regulations by industry and regulatory agency for all federal regulations from 1997–2012. The quantification of regulations at the industry level for all industries is without precedent. RegData measures regulation for industries at the two, three, and four‐digit levels of the North American Industry Classification System. We created this database using text analysis to count binding constraints in the wording of regulations, as codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, and to measure the applicability of regulatory text to different industries. We validate our measures of regulation by examining known episodes of regulatory growth and deregulation, as well as by comparing our measures to an existing, cross‐sectional measure of regulation. Researchers can use this database to study the determinants of industry regulations and to study regulations’ effects on a massive array of dependent variables, both across industries and time.

Suggested Citation

  • Omar Al‐Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, 2017. "RegData: A numerical database on industry‐specific regulations for all United States industries and federal regulations, 1997–2012," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 109-123, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:11:y:2017:i:1:p:109-123
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Trebbi & Miao Ben Zhang, 2022. "The Cost of Regulatory Compliance in the United States," NBER Working Papers 30691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Ince, Baris, 2024. "How do regulatory costs affect mergers and acquisitions decisions and outcomes?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    3. McLaughlin, Patrick & Potts, Jason, 2019. "RegData: Australia," Working Papers 10062, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    4. Dustin Chambers & Patrick A. McLaughlin & Tyler Richards, 2022. "Regulation, entrepreneurship, and firm size," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 108-134, April.
    5. Dustin Chambers & Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, 2023. "Regulation, entrepreneurship, and dynamism," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 64(5), pages 2449-2466, May.
    6. McLaughlin, Patrick & Broughel, James & Bailey, James, 2020. "Larger Polities Are More Regulated," Working Papers 10717, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    7. Chambers, Dustin, 2021. "Toward a Formalization of Policy Analytics," Working Papers 11019, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    8. Ampaabeng, Kofi & McLaughlin, Patrick & Powers, Thurston, 2022. "Census of Regulatory Restrctions," Annals of Computational Economics, George Mason University, Mercatus Center, May.
    9. Freire, Danilo, 2021. "How to Improve Data Validation in Five Steps," Working Papers 11017, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    10. Makridis, Christos & Rossi, Alberto, 2020. "Rise of the "Quants" in Financial Services: Regulation and Crowding Out of Routine Jobs," Working Papers 10026, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    11. Michelson, Noam, 2023. "The revolving door of former civil servants and firm value: A comprehensive approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    12. Lucas, David S. & Fuller, Caleb S. & Packard, Mark D., 2022. "Made to be broken? A theory of regulatory governance and rule-breaking entrepreneurial action," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 37(6).
    13. Makridis, Christos & McLaughlin, Patrick, 2024. "How State Occupational Licenses Affect Jobs and Salaries," Working Papers 12543, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    14. M. Kabir Hassan & M. Sydul Karim & Tarun Mukherjee, 2023. "Does corporate diversification retrench the effects of firm‐level political risk?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 663-702, November.
    15. McLaughlin, Patrick & Febrizio, Mark & Sherouse, Oliver & King, Scott, 2020. "Is Dodd-Frank the Biggest Law Ever?," Working Papers 09585, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    16. Chambers, Dustin & McLaughlin, Patrick, 2018. "Regulation, Entrepreneurship, and Firm Size," Working Papers 09458, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    17. MORIKAWA Masayuki, 2022. "Compliance Costs of Regulations and Productivity," Policy Discussion Papers 22025, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    18. Fullenbaum, Richard & Richards, Tyler, 2020. "The Impact of Regulatory Growth on Operating Costs," Working Papers 10308, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.

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