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Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds

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  • Yael Deutsch
  • Boaz Golany
  • Noam Goldberg
  • Uriel G. Rothblum

Abstract

This article discusses a two‐player noncooperative nonzero‐sum inspection game. There are multiple sites that are subject to potential inspection by the first player (an inspector). The second player (potentially a violator) has to choose a vector of violation probabilities over the sites, so that the sum of these probabilities do not exceed one. An efficient method is introduced to compute all Nash equilibria parametrically in the amount of resource that is available to the inspector. Sensitivity analysis reveals nonmonotonicity of the equilibrium utility of the inspector, considered as a function of the amount of resource that is available to it; a phenomenon which is a variant of the well‐known Braess paradox. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Yael Deutsch & Boaz Golany & Noam Goldberg & Uriel G. Rothblum, 2013. "Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(2), pages 125-140, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:navres:v:60:y:2013:i:2:p:125-140
    DOI: 10.1002/nav.21524
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Deutsch, Yael & Golany, Boaz & Rothblum, Uriel G., 2011. "Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(2), pages 422-430, December.
    2. Naraphorn Haphuriwat & Vicki M. Bier & Henry H. Willis, 2011. "Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(2), pages 88-102, June.
    3. Michael Maschler, 1966. "A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 11-33, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard von Stengel, 2016. "Recursive Inspection Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(3), pages 935-952, August.
    2. Deutsch, Yael & Goldberg, Noam & Perlman, Yael, 2019. "Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an n-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 274(2), pages 627-637.
    3. Noam Goldberg, 2017. "Non‐zero‐sum nonlinear network path interdiction with an application to inspection in terror networks," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 139-153, March.
    4. Yael Deutsch & Boaz Golany, 2016. "Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 237(1), pages 7-26, February.
    5. Deutsch, Yael, 2021. "A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(3), pages 1036-1052.

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