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Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals

Author

Listed:
  • Yael Deutsch

    (Technion, Israel Institute of Technology)

  • Boaz Golany

    (Technion, Israel Institute of Technology)

Abstract

This paper deals with an inspection game between a single inspector and several independent (potential) violators over a finite-time horizon. In each period, the inspector gets a renewable inspection resource, which cannot be saved and used in future periods. The inspector allocates it to inspect the (potential) violators. Each violator decides in each period whether to violate or not, and in what probability. A violation may be detected by the inspector with a known and positive probability. When a violation is detected, the responsible violator is “dismissed” from the game. The game terminates when all the violators are detected or when there are no more remaining periods. An efficient method to compute a Nash equilibrium for this game is developed, for any possible value of the (nominal) detection probability. The solution of the game shows that the violators always maintain their detection probability below 0.5.

Suggested Citation

  • Yael Deutsch & Boaz Golany, 2016. "Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 237(1), pages 7-26, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:237:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-014-1703-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-014-1703-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel Rothenstein & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "Imperfect Inspection Games Over Time," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 175-192, January.
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    6. Deutsch, Yael & Golany, Boaz & Rothblum, Uriel G., 2011. "Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(2), pages 422-430, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yael Deutsch & Boaz Golany, 2019. "Securing Gates of a Protected Area: A Hybrid Game and Queueing Theory Modeling Approach," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 16(1), pages 31-45, March.
    2. Deutsch, Yael & Goldberg, Noam & Perlman, Yael, 2019. "Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an n-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 274(2), pages 627-637.
    3. Deutsch, Yael, 2021. "A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(3), pages 1036-1052.

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