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A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game

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  • Michael Maschler

Abstract

An inspector's game is a non‐constant‐sum two‐person game in which one player has promised to perform a certain duty and the other player is allowed to inspect and verify occasionally that the duty has indeed been performed. A solution to a variant of such a game is given in this paper, based on the assumption that the inspector can announce his mixed strategy in advance, if he so wishes, whereas the other player, who has already given his promise, cannot threaten by explicitly saying that he will not keep his word.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Maschler, 1966. "A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 11-33, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:navlog:v:13:y:1966:i:1:p:11-33
    DOI: 10.1002/nav.3800130103
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Iván Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2022. "Monitoring with career concerns," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 404-428, June.
    2. Roger Bate & Ginger Zhe Jin & Aparna Mathur, 2015. "Falsified or Substandard? Assessing Price and Non‐price Signals of Drug Quality," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 687-711, October.
    3. Deutsch, Yael & Goldberg, Noam & Perlman, Yael, 2019. "Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an n-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 274(2), pages 627-637.
    4. Ryusuke Hohzaki & Diasuke Kudoh & Toru Komiya, 2006. "An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(8), pages 761-771, December.
    5. Thomas S. Ferguson & Costis Melolidakis, 1998. "On the inspection game," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(3), pages 327-334, April.
    6. Yael Deutsch & Boaz Golany & Noam Goldberg & Uriel G. Rothblum, 2013. "Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(2), pages 125-140, March.
    7. Ederlina Ganatuin‐Nocon & Tyrone Ang, 2020. "Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(6), pages 438-452, September.
    8. Stefanos Leonardos & Costis Melolidakis, 2018. "On the Commitment Value and Commitment Optimal Strategies in Bimatrix Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 1-28, September.
    9. D. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams, 1992. "Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(3), pages 395-414, September.
    10. Dong, Xiaoqing & Li, Chaolin & Li, Ji & Wang, Jia & Huang, Wantao, 2010. "A game-theoretic analysis of implementation of cleaner production policies in the Chinese electroplating industry," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 54(12), pages 1442-1448.
    11. Deutsch, Yael, 2021. "A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(3), pages 1036-1052.
    12. Guzmán, Cristóbal & Riffo, Javiera & Telha, Claudio & Van Vyve, Mathieu, 2022. "A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(2), pages 727-739.
    13. Endre Boros & Noam Goldberg & Paul Kantor & Jonathan Word, 2011. "Optimal sequential inspection policies," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 89-119, July.

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