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Distributing inspections in space and time – Proposed solution of a difficult problem

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  • Avenhaus, Rudolf
  • Krieger, Thomas

Abstract

There are several identical facilities in which precious or dangerous material is processed or stored. Since parts of this material may be diverted by some manager or employee of these facilities or since failures in the processing of the material may occur, an authorized organization inspects these facilities regularly at the beginning and at the end of some reference time interval. In order to shorten the time required for detecting such an illegal activity or failures, in addition some interim inspections are performed in these facilities during the reference time interval. The optimal distribution of these interim inspections in space and time poses considerable analytical problems since adversary strategies have to be taken into account. So far only special cases have been analysed successfully, but these results lead to a conjecture for the solution of the general case which is surprisingly simple in view of the complexity of this inspection problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Avenhaus, Rudolf & Krieger, Thomas, 2013. "Distributing inspections in space and time – Proposed solution of a difficult problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 231(3), pages 712-719.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:231:y:2013:i:3:p:712-719
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.06.028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel Rothenstein & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "Imperfect Inspection Games Over Time," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 175-192, January.
    2. Deutsch, Yael & Golany, Boaz & Rothblum, Uriel G., 2011. "Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(2), pages 422-430, December.
    3. Fandel, G. & Trockel, J., 2013. "Avoiding non-optimal management decisions by applying a three-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 226(1), pages 85-93.
    4. Avenhaus, Rudolf & Canty, Morton John, 2005. "Playing for time: A sequential inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 167(2), pages 475-492, December.
    5. Harvey Diamond, 1982. "Minimax Policies for Unobservable Inspections," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 139-153, February.
    6. Avenhaus, Rudolf & Von Stengel, Bernhard & Zamir, Shmuel, 2002. "Inspection games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 51, pages 1947-1987, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 774-779.

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