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An inventory model of incentives for on‐time delivery in just‐in‐time purchasing contracts

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  • John R. Grout
  • David P. Christy

Abstract

This article formulates an analytic model of just‐in‐time purchasing contracts and compares the minimum cost solution with the cost attainable through vertical integration. The models use standard inventory theory cost parameters and decision variables. The results quantify the increase in cost of buying an item rather than making it. Optimal incentives are characterized when JIT purchasing contracts are used. When JIT purchasing is implemented, buffer inventories are typically reduced. This inventory reduction makes on‐time delivery critical to the buyer; yet timeliness is controlled by the supplier. As an incentive to provide on‐time delivery, the buyer offers the supplier a bonus for on‐time delivery. The supplier chooses a flow time allowance based upon the bonus offered. First‐ and second‐order conditions are characterized in general, and examples are provided for exponentially and uniformly distributed flow times. The delivery timeliness obtainable in a vertically integrated firm is determined and compared with timeliness obtainable between separate firms. This comparison indicates that buyers who choose to purchase materials from a separate firm are more likely to experience late deliveries. The relationship between the value of the bonus and the proportion of on‐time deliveries is also considered. The bonus required to achieve the same probability of on‐time delivery as under vertical integration is also determined. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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  • John R. Grout & David P. Christy, 1993. "An inventory model of incentives for on‐time delivery in just‐in‐time purchasing contracts," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(6), pages 863-877, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:navres:v:40:y:1993:i:6:p:863-877
    DOI: 10.1002/1520-6750(199310)40:63.0.CO;2-1
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