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Emergence of Captive Finance Companies and Risk Segmentation in Loan Markets: Theory and Evidence

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  • JOHN M. BARRON
  • BYUNG‐UK CHONG
  • MICHAEL E. STATEN

Abstract

A seller with some degree of market power in its product market can earn rents. In this context, there is a gain to granting credit to purchase of the product and thus to the establishment of a captive finance company. This paper examines the optimal behavior of such a durable good seller and its captive finance company. The model predicts a critical difference between the captive finance company's credit standard and that of independent lenders (“banks”), namely, that the captive finance company will adopt a more lenient credit standard. Thus, we should expect the likelihood of repayment of a captive loan to be lower than that of a bank loan, other things equal. This prediction is tested using a unique data set drawn from a major credit bureau in the United States, and the evidence supports the theoretical prediction.

Suggested Citation

  • John M. Barron & Byung‐Uk Chong & Michael E. Staten, 2008. "Emergence of Captive Finance Companies and Risk Segmentation in Loan Markets: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(1), pages 173-192, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:40:y:2008:i:1:p:173-192
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00108.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Elliott, David & Meisenzahl, Ralf & Peydró, José-Luis & Turner, Bryce C., 2019. "Nonbanks, Banks, and Monetary Policy: U.S. Loan-Level Evidence since the 1990s," EconStor Preprints 216796, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    2. repec:ecb:ecbdps:202010 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Jauling Tseng, 2021. "How do finance companies' advantages affect competitive strategies in short‐ and intermediate‐term loan markets? A theoretical analysis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 4295-4302, July.
    4. Latino, Carmelo & Pelizzon, Loriana & Riedel, Max, 2023. "How to green the European Auto ABS market? A literature survey," SAFE Working Paper Series 391, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    5. Laeven, Luc & Boot, Arnoud & Hoffmann, Peter & Ratnovski, Lev, 2020. "Financial Intermediation and Technology: What’s Old, What’s New?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15004, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Boot, Arnoud & Hoffmann, Peter & Laeven, Luc & Ratnovski, Lev, 2021. "Fintech: what’s old, what’s new?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).

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