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Continuous Versus Discrete Time in Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game Experiments

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Listed:
  • M. Djiguemde

    (Institut Agro)

  • D. Dubois

    (Institut Agro)

  • A. Sauquet

    (Institut Agro)

  • M. Tidball

    (Institut Agro)

Abstract

We study the impact of discrete versus continuous time on the behavior of agents in the context of a dynamic common pool resource game. To this purpose, we consider a linear quadratic model and conduct a lab experiment in which agents exploit a renewable resource with an infinite horizon. We use a differential game for continuous time and derive its discrete time approximation. In the single agent setting, we fail to detect, on a battery of indicators, any difference between agents’ behavior in discrete and continuous time. Conversely, in the two-player setting, significantly more agents can be classified as myopic and end up with a low resource level in discrete time. Continuous time seems to allow for better cooperation and thus greater sustainability of the resource than does discrete time.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Djiguemde & D. Dubois & A. Sauquet & M. Tidball, 2022. "Continuous Versus Discrete Time in Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game Experiments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(4), pages 985-1014, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:82:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10640-022-00700-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-022-00700-2
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