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What taxpayers, governments and tax economists do – and what they should do

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  • Joel Slemrod

Abstract

The distinction between positive economics – describing economic programmes, situations and conditions as they exist – and normative economics – prescribing policies – has a long history. It is an especially important distinction in public economics, which by its nature concerns the actions of government. In this essay, I consider how two relatively recent developments in tax economics alter, blur or at least complicate the classic distinctions between positive and normative economics. The two developments I address are the insights generated by the study of behavioural economics and increased attention to tax evasion and tax enforcement. I organise my thoughts by addressing how three sets of actors central to public finance actually behave and should behave – taxpayers, governments and tax economists. I argue that tax economics should take seriously the substantial presence of behavioural anomalies and tax evasion, and that it has already begun to do so. I suggest some directions this effort might profitably take.

Suggested Citation

  • Joel Slemrod, 2024. "What taxpayers, governments and tax economists do – and what they should do," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(1), pages 7-19, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:fistud:v:45:y:2024:i:1:p:7-19
    DOI: 10.1111/1475-5890.12324
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